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BANNING METAL MINING IN GUATEMALA 
Raquel Aldana* and Randall S. Abate**† 
Water and life are more valuable than gold. 
—Roadside sign in the vicinity of San Rafael mine in Guatemala 
 
Metal mining is unsustainable for Guatemala and its harms 
insurmountable for its people. Guatemalans who oppose metal mining have 
been fighting for decades domestically and internationally against the 
environmental degradation and other human rights abuses from metal 
mining activities in the country with little to show for their efforts. The State 
is too weak and corrupt to offer much hope for reform. Guatemala requires 
extensive governance reforms to become the type of strong democracy 
capable of reaping the potential benefits of metal mining in its territory. This 
is a long-term project. Most Guatemalans opposed to metal mining already 
know this, and the struggle is largely to ban all metal mining in the country. 
However, the prospect of a ban is elusive, in part because the country may 
face liability from investors affected by the ban. This Article presents the best 
case for a metal mining ban while exploring alternatives to minimize the 
investor liability costs to the country. First, the Article recommends that 
Guatemala exercise its sovereign right to adopt a law banning all future 
metal mining concessions. Second, Guatemala should rely on existing 
domestic laws to close the metal mines and mitigate the substantial damages 
resulting from these activities. Under either approach, Guatemala is likely 
to face investor liability in the millions and perhaps lose future investment in 
the country. This Article offers Guatemala suggestions for defending and 
mitigating these costs by relying on comparative studies of similar actions 
taken by Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
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Metal mining is not big business in Guatemala. It generates less than one 
percent of the country’s gross national product and employs less than one 
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percent of the official workforce in the country.1 The metal mining industry 
has also been in decline since 2012,2 and a significant subpart of the industry 
will disappear completely in a matter of decades when all of the gold, silver, 
and other metals have been extracted.3 
For such a small industry, metal mining represents a giant problem for 
Guatemala. Metal mining has generated chaos in the country and provoked 
ire among many within and beyond its borders. Metal mining in Guatemala 
is controversial for significant reasons. First, at an alarmingly quick pace, 
metal mining is destroying much of the country’s beautiful environmental 
resources.4 Second, this destruction is occurring largely without the consent 
of the affected communities—both indigenous and non-indigenous.5 For 
these communities, the few benefits—mostly in the form of jobs with higher 
wages for some of the local residents—pale in comparison to the short-term 
and long-term harms.6 In the short term, residents in metal mining 
communities are disturbed by noise; sickened by contamination; 
impoverished by reduced water supply and food production; divided by 
conflict even among friends and family; and criminalized and physically 
harmed during protests.7 In the long term, water depletion and contamination 
linger, mountains and landscapes disappear, and the jobs and monies that 
mines brought dissipate. The affected communities—and the entire country 
as a result—are left with an even bleaker future than prior to exploitation, 
literally and figuratively. 
These environmental and human rights harms alone justify a rejection of 
the industry in Guatemala. The disdain for metal mining, however, lies 
exactly in the reasons for its presence in the country. Why is an industry that 
represents such an insignificant economic investment and with such 
destructive characteristics allowed to operate in the country? The answer is 
cynical but tragically true. Metal mining makes a great deal of investment 
sense to the foreign investors and shareholders8 and to the economic elite and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See infra Parts I.A & I.C.  
 2. See infra Part I.C. 
 3. INSTITUTO DE AGRICULTURA, RECURSOS NATURALES Y AMBIENTE [IARNA], PERFIL 
AMBIENTAL DE GUATEMALA 2008–2009: LAS SEÑALES AMBIENTALES CRÍTICAS Y SU RELACIÓN CON EL 
DESARROLLO § 3.8.2.1, 198–200 (2009) [hereinafter IARNA], 
http://www.infoiarna.org.gt/media/file/PERFAM2008/PERFAM2008.pdf. 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 6. See infra Part I.C. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 8. Investors that support metal mining operations in Guatemala are largely foreign, principally 
from Canada. See infra Part I.A. 
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self-interested politicians who profit from it.9 In turn, as a struggling 
democracy with weak laws and institutions, but strongly favorable 
investment laws and practices, Guatemala is the ideal host for the 
continuation of corporate practices that are senseless and destructive.10 
This same assessment of metal mining in Guatemala applies across the 
region and globally, particularly in developing nations with similar 
democratic and social struggles.11 It also applies to several other types of 
industries that extract natural resources or cheap labor for global 
consumption.12 Unlike Guatemala, however, some of these nations are 
stepping back and instituting important reforms to limit or ban certain types 
of mining.13 There are important lessons in these reforms for Guatemala. 
This Article proposes recommendations for managing Guatemala’s 
metal mining problem. It proceeds from the premise that metal mining is a 
bad investment for Guatemala, at least in the short term. Metal mining is 
never a sustainable practice for any country because metal is an exhaustible 
and non-renewable natural resource and its extraction is inherently toxic and 
destructive.14 There is a legitimate argument that metal mining may be 
necessary for development and that it could be done in ways that significantly 
reduce the harms to the environment and communities. This Article does not 
address whether or how Guatemala might choose to engage in metal mining 
in the future. Rather, it asserts that Guatemala is ill prepared to implement a 
metal mining regime that makes sense for the country at this time. 
Guatemala is now grappling—in good ways—with significant and 
visible democratic problems. For the first time in the near decade of the 
United Nations Commission against Impunity’s (CICIG) operation in 
Guatemala, its investigations are finally exposing the shameful and cynical 
acts of corrupt politicians.15 Not a single Guatemalan is surprised by the dirty 
secrets the CICIG’s wiretaps and secret recordings revealed.16 Several high-
level officials resigned following the revelations, including the Vice 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See infra Part I.C. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III.B.  
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
 13. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1. 
 14. See infra Part I.B. 
 15. See, e.g., COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL CONTRA LA IMPUNIDAD EN GUATEMALA, JUSTICIA 
PARA TODOS, BOLETÍN INFORMATIVO, CIUDADANOS CONTRA LA CORRUPCIÓN (2015), 
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=boletin_informativo. 
 16. OBSERVATORIO DE CONFLICTOS MINEROS DE AMÉRICA LATINA, CONFLICTOS MINEROS EN 
AMÉRICA LATINA, EXTRACCIÓN, SAQUEO, Y AGRESIÓN: ESTADO DE SITUACIÓN EN 2014, at 2 (2015), 
http://www.conflictosmineros.net/agregar-documento/publicaciones-ocmal/conflictos-mineros-en-
america-latina-extraccion-saqueo-y-agresion-estado-de-situacion-en-2014/detail. 
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President and the President who now face criminal charges for their acts of 
corruption.17 This alone represents remarkable progress for Guatemala. 
These potentially monumental transitions in Guatemala, however, do not 
guarantee real and sustained reforms in the country. Today, nearly 20 years 
after the signing of an ambitious peace agenda, Guatemala is nowhere near a 
strong enough democracy as it needs to be to manage metal mining in order 
to minimize harms and maximize benefits for its citizens.18 Much needs to 
happen first, including electoral reform, eradication of deep inequality, 
greater transparency in public spending, and tax and social spending reforms. 
This Article addresses the primary concerns that pertain to mining: reforming 
the 1997 Mining Law; the need to regulate water and the consultative 
process; and the need to improve transparency in tax collection, public 
spending, and social investment, particularly as it relates to the mining 
industry.19 These reforms must occur in tandem with the broader and 
systemic reforms already mentioned if metal mining is to be successful. Until 
then, Guatemala should consider banning metal mining in the country. This 
course would not be unchartered territory in the region. Other nations, with 
Costa Rica as one of the best examples, have paved the way.20 
Banning metal mining in Guatemala, even if temporarily, will likely face 
fierce opposition from investors and potentially from Guatemala’s important 
trading partners. Guatemalans would be right to be concerned about two 
possible negative consequences from the decision to ban or limit metal 
mining: (1) companies already holding exploration and exploitation licenses 
could sue in international tribunals or foreign courts for millions alleging 
expropriation; and (2) Guatemala could damage its relationship with Canada, 
the United States, and other potential trading partners and international 
economic institutions. This Article addresses strategies and defenses for 
banning mining in Guatemala in response to expropriation claims in 
international tribunals. Also, it proposes standards and norms that arbitrators 
should apply to resolve these claims. As to the second concern, the potential 
impacts on trade and investment might be exaggerated and overstated. 
Guatemala nonetheless should explore alternatives for sustainable 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Press Release, Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, A Prisión 
Preventiva Otto Pérez Molina (Sept. 8, 2015), 
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=632&cntnt01showall=&
cntnt01returnid=1377. 
 18. Guatemala’s Peace Process: A Look Back on the 1996 Peace Accords, COUNCIL ON 
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (July 30, 2015), http://www.coha.org/guatemalas-crippled-peace-process-a-look-
back-on-the-1996-peace-accords/. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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development that would be better for the country in the long term. Costa 
Rica’s ecotourism industry serves as a model for Guatemala in this regard.21 
Part I of this Article explains the nature and scope of the metal mining 
industry in Guatemala. It also examines the environmental, health, property, 
and social impacts of metal mining and discusses the unbalanced costs and 
harms of the industry under Guatemala’s status quo. Part II documents the 
challenges and gaps in the existing domestic and international legal 
frameworks that attempt to regulate metal mining activities in Guatemala. 
Part III proposes an incremental model for Guatemala to address its metal 
mining problem. First, this Article recommends that Guatemala exercise its 
sovereign right to adopt a law banning all future metal mining concessions. 
Second, Guatemala should rely on existing domestic laws to close the mines 
in order to mitigate the substantial damages resulting from these activities. 
Under either approach, Guatemala is likely to face investor liability in the 
millions, and perhaps lose future investment in the country. This Article 
offers Guatemala suggestions for defending and mitigating these costs by 
relying on comparative studies of similar actions taken by Costa Rica and El 
Salvador. 
I. METAL MINING IN CONTEXT 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, investment in metals moved out of 
traditional middle- and high-income countries toward the developing 
world.22 And in the last ten years, due to increased demand in countries like 
Brazil, India, Russia, China, and South Africa, metal mining has grown 
exponentially in the world. Technological advances allowed for ever-more 
diffuse deposits of minerals to be profitably mined.23 In turn, many 
developing nations, including in Latin America, adopted policies designed to 
encourage foreign investment, specifically in extractive industries.24 Not 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 22. Michael L. Dougherty, The Global Gold Mining Industry, Junior Firms, and Civil Society 
Resistance in Guatemala, 10 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 1, 4 (2011), 
http://devstudies.wisc.edu/docs/BLAR%20Early%20View.pdf. 
 23. Id.; see also JEAN ACQUATELLA ET AL., COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y 
EL CARIBE, RENTAS DE RECURSOS NATURALES NO RENOVABLES EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE: 
EVOLUCIÓN Y PARTICIPACIÓN ESTATAL, 1990–2010, at 11 (2013), 
http://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/7044-rentas-de-recursos-naturales-no-renovables-en-america-
latina-y-el-caribe. 
 24. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 4. 
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surprisingly, Latin America’s contributions to metal mining have been 
significant in recent years.25 
This transition in the metal mining industry was accompanied by the 
proliferation of small or junior exploration firms in new investment target 
countries.26 In general, there are three categories of firms conducting metal 
mining operations in Latin America: senior firms, mid-tier firms, and junior 
firms. Junior firms account for a very small share of overall mineral 
production, yet they represent the majority of the metal mining companies 
today.27 In practice, junior firms typically engage solely in exploration of 
potential sites and have limited production sites.28 On the other hand, senior 
firms typically derive their revenue from production and sale, often taking 
sites explored by juniors into production.29 These specific roles undertaken 
by each category of mining firm results in interdependence between them. 
Senior firms depend on junior firms to undertake the exploration and junior 
firms depend on senior firms to take their sites into production. Junior firms, 
in fact, conduct most of the exploration of new investment targets in the 
developing world and sometimes sell to senior firms only in exploitation 
phases.30 
While junior firms typically are not the ones engaging in the actual 
exploitation of a site, they still make up the majority of the mining companies 
in Latin America, and specifically in Guatemala.31 There are nine mining 
firms operating in Guatemala, seven of which are junior.32 Junior firms have 
proliferated for a number of reasons. Most notably, recent technological 
advances in mining techniques have resulted in an increased number of 
commercially viable sites, which in turn reduces the entry cost barrier for 
smaller firms.33 In addition, the Canadian government incentivizes smaller 
                                                                                                                 
 25. In 2010, for example, Latin America produced 45.3% of the world’s copper and 30.8% of 
silver. The biggest producers of metals are Chile (copper), Peru (gold), Mexico (copper and silver), Cuba 
(nickel), and Brazil (gold and nickel). INSTITUTO CENTROAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES, LA 
MINERÍA EN GUATEMALA: REALIDAD Y DESAFÍOS FRENTE A LA DEMOCRACIA Y EL DESARROLLO (2014) 
[hereinafter ICEFI REPORT], http://icefi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/mineria-impresion.pdf; see also 
ACQUATELLA ET AL., supra note 23, at 27–28. 
 26. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 4. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 4–5. 
 30. Id. at 5. 
 31. Id. at 4, 6. 
 32. Id. at 6. 
 33. Id. at 5. 
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firm investment by providing tax benefits that make 100% of capital invested 
in domestic junior activity tax deductible for the investor.34 
While technological advances and incentivizing policies have created an 
environment where newer, smaller firms can flourish, these junior firms now 
find themselves in intense competition with one another. This competition 
has led them to cut corners when it comes to adopting environmentally and 
socially responsible techniques—presumably in an effort to simply get ahead 
of the competition.35 Additionally, lenient Canadian corporate oversight has 
contributed to this failure to meet environmental and social standards.36 By 
the time senior firms become involved in mining, they inherit the 
controversies and conflicts that their junior colleagues left behind.37 
Another notable element of junior firms that leads to cutting corners has 
been their demonstrated lack of motivation to engage with the host 
communities in which they have set up shop.38 This could also be a result of 
the intense competition these firms face, which leads them to cut corners in 
order to get ahead.39 Another possible explanation for this lack of motivation 
could be the simple fact that junior firms, being only focused on the 
exploration of sites rather than the long-term exploitation, are less invested 
in trying to form relationships with the host communities. 
A. The Metal Mining Industry in Guatemala 
Guatemala is not a metal-rich country, at least as measured in terms of 
production. In fact, Guatemala’s economy, workforce, and exports have 
traditionally been centered in agriculture.40 While metal mining represents a 
significant share of the mineral industry of Guatemala, the entire industry 
recently represented only 0.5% to 2.83% of the Gross National Product 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 7 (discussing how Glamis Gold, a junior firm, did not adequately consult with the local 
communities about project development). 
 39. Id. at 12–13. 
 40. LYUBA ZARSKY & LEONARDO STANLEY, GLOB. DEV. & ENV’T INST., SEARCHING FOR GOLD 
IN THE HIGHLANDS OF GUATEMALA: ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF THE MARLIN 
MINE 13 (2011), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/marlinminereport.html.  
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(GNP).41 In 2014, the entire mining industry yielded Guatemala only 0.8% 
of its GNP.42 
In Guatemala, both precious and base metals are mined43 and largely 
exploited for export by Canadian companies. Metal mining constitutes over 
90% of all mining production in the country.44 Non-metallic minerals, largely 
used for industrial domestic production, are much more abundant in 
volume;45 however, non-metallic mineral mining represents less than 5% of 
the mining industry revenues in the country.46 Both types of mining often 
lead to significant environmental harms, depending on the method of 
extraction employed.47 Metal mining, however, generates more conflicts in 
Guatemala than other types of mining, including hydrocarbon and non-
mineral mining.48 Moreover, metal mining in Guatemala occurs principally 
in rural areas, which disproportionately affects indigenous communities and 
their communal lands.49 
While metal mining does not represent a significant portion of 
Guatemala’s GNP, it has comprised an important, but steadily declining, 
portion of Guatemala’s Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). Between 2010 and 
                                                                                                                 
 41. In 2004, for example, the Ministry of Energy and Mining reported that the mineral mining 
industry comprised 0.3% of the GNP. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 
2005, at 6 (2005), http://www.mem.gob.gt/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/1._Anuario_Estadistico_Minero_2005.pdf. At its peak of production in 2011, 
mining reached 2.83% of the GNP of Guatemala. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 53. In most years, 
mineral mining represents only about 1% of the total GDP. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 13. 
 42. DEPARTMENTO DE ESTADÍSTICAS MACROECONÓMICAS, BANCO DE GUATEMALA, 
PRODUCTO INTERNO BRUTO TRIMESTRAL, CUARTO TRIMESTRE DE 2014, at 7 (2015), 
http://www.banguat.gob.gt/cuentasnac/4T_2014_JM.pdf. 
 43. IARNA, supra note 3, at 199. 
 44. Cuadro Flujo de IED por Activida de Económica y País de Procedencia 2012, BANCO DE 
GUATEMALA, http://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=/Publica/v_man_bpagos/flujo_IED_2012.htm 
&e=111758 (last visited Jan. 25, 2016); MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO 
MINERO 2014, at 8 (2014) [hereinafter ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2014], 
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ANUARIO-ESTAD%C3%8DSTICO-MINERO-
2014.pdf.  
 45. Non-metallic mineral mining is projected to continue in Guatemala for several hundred 
years. In contrast, most metals in Guatemala will be exhausted in about a decade. IARNA, supra note 3, 
at 198, 200. 
 46. ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2014, supra note 44, at 8. 
 47. PEACE BRIGADES INTERNATIONAL, LA MINERÍA: ¿BENEFICIO PARA GUATEMALA? 3 (2010) 
[hereinafter PBI MINING BULLETIN], 
http://www.peacebrigades.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/guatemala/files/spanish/PBI_Boletin_21_es
p.pdf. 
 48. OBSERVATORIO DE CONFLICTOS MINEROS DE AMÉRICA LATINA, CONFLICTOS MINEROS EN 
AMÉRICA LATINA, EXTRACCIÓN, SAQUEO, Y AGRESIÓN: ESTADO DE SITUACIÓN EN 2014, at 2 (2014), 
http://www.conflictosmineros.net/agregar-documento/publicaciones-ocmal/conflictos-mineros-en-
america-latina-extraccion-saqueo-y-agresion-estado-de-situacion-en-2014/detail. 
 49. Id. 
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2015, Guatemala’s data (which combines agricultural and all mining 
investment) show those industries’ highest share of DFI to have been in 2012 
at 33.6%, or $417.8 million.50 Since then, however, the amount has dropped 
significantly to 10.3% in 2015, at only $88.8 million.51 In the two years prior 
to 2015, investment from mining (and agriculture) comprised 25.8% ($334.7 
million) and 14.5% ($201.2 million).52 The non-renewable characteristic of 
minerals, however, means that this rate of investment will likely only last for 
a few more years.53 
In recent years, Canadian companies have been the primary, and 
sometimes sole, investors in these metal-mining projects in Guatemala.54 
Most of these companies are junior, although some have established formal 
and informal strategic partnerships with senior firms.55 Guatemala has 
become a target for junior metal mining investment because it possesses the 
right mix of flexible laws and policies and amenable mineralization to 
warrant investment.56 Indeed, “this confluence of conditions has enabled 
Guatemala to become one of the lowest-cost gold producers in Latin 
America,” if not the world.57 
Metal mining is not a new phenomenon in Guatemala,58 but it has taken 
on a new intensity since the late 1990s with the end of the civil war and the 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Cuadro Flujo de IED por Activida de Económica y País de Procedencia 2012, supra note 
44.   
 51. Flujos de Inversión Extranjera Directa Según País de Procedencia y Actividad Económica 
2007-2015, BANCO DE GUATEMALA, https://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=/Publica/v_man_ 
bpagos/flujo_IED_2007_2015.htm&e=122316 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). The 2015 figures could reflect 
several factors discussed elsewhere in this paper, including the temporary moratorium on mining 
investment in the country. 
 52. Cuadro Flujo de IED por Actividad Económica y País de Procedencia 2013, BANCO DE 
GUATEMALA, https://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=/Publica/v_man_bpagos/flujo_IED_2013. 
htm&e=111762 (last visited May 12, 2016) [hereinafter 2013 Chart of Guatemala’s Economic Activity]; 
Cuadro Flujo de IED por Actividad Económica y País de Procedencia 2014, BANCO DE GUATEMALA, 
www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=Publica/v_man_bpagos/flujos_IED_2014.htm&e=115682 (last 
visited May 12, 2016) [hereinafter 2014 Chart of Guatemala’s Economic Activity]. 
 53. IARNA, supra note 3, at 200. 
 54. The only other notable investor has been Russia, but only for the exceptional years of 2012 
and 2013. 2013 Chart of Guatemala’s Economic Activity, supra note 52; 2014 Chart of Guatemala’s 
Economic Activity, supra note 52. 
 55. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 7. 
 56. Id. at 9. In Guatemala, mineral deposits are comprised generally of volcanically produced 
pyroclastic and epithermal deposits. Both are relatively superficial and amenable to surface mining 
techniques and cyanide leach milling processes. Id. at 12. 
 57. Id. at 9. 
 58. Indeed, metal mining in Guatemala dates back to colonial times, possibly as early as the year 
1600. ASOCIACIÓN DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y ESTUDIOS SOCIALES, ESTUDIO COSTO BENEFICIO DE LA MINA 
MARLIN EN SAN MARCOS, GUATEMALA 15 (2010) [hereinafter MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY], 
https://goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/estudio-costo-beneficio-mina-marlin.pdf.  
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adoption of very favorable laws for mining companies.59 Metal mining, as an 
important modern industry, dates back only to 1999 when Guatemala granted 
its first major foreign investment project in more than 20 years. This project 
took the form of a mining exploration license granted to Montana 
Exploradora de Guatemala, a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian company 
Montana Gold.60 By the time Montana Exploradora began its exploitation at 
the Marlin I mine in 2005, Canadian ownership had transferred to Glamis 
Gold (a junior) and then to Goldcorp (a senior), where it remains today.61 The 
Marlin I project received support from the World Bank with a $45 million 
loan granted through its private sector branch, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC).62 The arrival of Marlin I was “soon followed by Canadian 
INCO (Hudbay Minerals since 2008), which had developed plans to reopen 
the EXMIBAL nickel mine in El Estor, Izabal.”63 
This Part of the Article focuses solely on the active metal mines in the 
country because there is little to no information available on inactive or 
pending licenses. Guatemala grants three types of mining licenses: 
reconnaissance; exploration (for three years and renewable for two more 
three-year periods); and exploitation (up to 25 years).64 Active mines are 
those in operation pursuant to an exploitation license.65 Today, piecing 
together the mining reports available from Guatemala’s Ministry of Energy 
and Mining (MEM), there are a total of six active metal mining sites in 
Guatemala. They are as follows: Marlin I in San Miguel Ixtahuacán and 
Sipacapa, San Marcos; El Sastre in San Antonio La Paz, El Progreso; Cerro 
Blanco in Asunción Mita, Jutiapa; Fenix, in El Estor, Izabal; El Escobal, in 
San Rafael, Las Flores, Santa Rosa; and Extraction Project in Sechol, Alta 
Verapaz.66 The government’s 2015 data, however, puts the total number of 
operating metal mines (including inactive mines) at 79, with 320 more 
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 61. Id. at 12. 
 62. Id. at 13. 
 63. Id. at 12. 
 64. Ley de Minería, Decreto Número 48-97 (1997) (Guat.) [hereinafter Mining Law], 
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/1997/gtdcx48-1997.pdf. 
 65. Id. 
 66. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2013, at 8 (2013) 
[hereinafter ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2013], http://www.mem.gob.gt/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/ANUARIO-ESTAD%C3%8DSTICO-MINERO-20131.pdf; see also ICEFI 
REPORT, supra note 25, at 28–30. 
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pending metal mining licenses.67 The majority of the active mines are 
concentrated in the following departments: Izabal, San Marcos, 
Quetzaltenango, Huehuetenango, Alta Verapaz, and Baja Verapaz. These 
regions are largely inhabited by indigenous peoples. But licenses have also 
been approved in the following regions: Guatemala City, Santa Rosa, Jutiapa, 
Jalapa, Chiquimula, Zacapa, and el Progreso, where the non-indigenous 
population is the majority.68 
In the Department of San Marcos, MEM has granted a total of 22 mining 
licenses, 11 of which are to Goldcorp, Inc.69 Marlin I, however, is the only 
current operation in the region.70 The Marlin I mine is an example of a new 
generation of mines of large size and low cost. The total development costs 
of the mining project were estimated at $254 million while the total sales of 
raw and exported product were estimated in 2005 to be $893 million over ten 
years.71 It consists of a 20 km exploitation concession, which has been 
transformed into a combined 6 km open pit and underground mine in which 
gold and silver are extracted through a process of cyanide vat leaching.72 It 
is estimated to produce 2.5 million ounces of gold and 36 million ounces of 
silver over a lifetime of ten years.73 The mine is located within two 
municipalities in the highlands populated by about 52,000 indigenous 
people—San Miguel Ixtahuacán (home to 87% of the mine’s operations) and 
Sipacapa.74 Poverty rates in these communities are above 97%.75 The major 
industry is subsistence farming; individual families grow corn and beans and 
keep livestock but the land, while held individually, forms part of the 
collective property.76 Agricultural income is low due to poor soil and little 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Licencias Vigentes y Solicitudes en Trámite por Tipo Según Categoría Mineral, MINISTERIO 
DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, http://www.mem.gob.gt/mineria/estadisticas-mineras/ (follow “Licencias Vigentes 
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 68. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 30. 
 69. Id. at 40. 
 70. Id. 
 71. VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 20. 
 72. Id. at 19–20. 
 73. Id. at 20; ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 34. 
 74. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: MINING IN GUATEMALA: RIGHTS AT RISK 10 
(2014) [hereinafter AI MINING REPORT], https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr34/002/2014/en/. 
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FOUND., http://www.fundacionsierramadre.org/FSM16a_san_miguel_ixtahuacan.htm (last visited Mar. 
27, 2016);  Sipacapa, SIERRA MADRE FOUND., 
http://www.fundacionsierramadre.org/FSM17a_sipacapa.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
 75. VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 22. 
 76. Id. at 21. 
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irrigation infrastructure.77 Other sources of employment include seasonal 
work at coffee and sugar cane plantations. The major source of income is 
derived from remittances.78 
El Cerro Blanco Mine, owned by Goldcorp of Canada and operated by 
Entre Mares, SA of Guatemala, is located in the Trifinio Biosphere Reserve. 
This mine is about 45 minutes from the border with El Salvador in Jutiapa, 
which is a protected area.79 President Berger granted the mine’s exploration 
license in 2004 and Goldcorp was expected to complete its final feasibility 
study by 2013.80 Despite strong opposition focused on its expected 
environmental impacts, the mine is currently under excavation by Dumas, a 
French-Canadian underground mining contractor.81 
The Fenix project is located in El Estor in Northeastern Guatemala, and 
on the shore of the country’s largest freshwater lake, Lake Izabal.82 The area 
is known for its rich biodiversity and its substantial nickel reserves.83Also, 
“Indigenous Maya Q’eqchi’ communities represent more than 90% of the 
population, most of whom make a living through subsistence farming and 
fishing.”84 The mine has operated intermittently and with significant violent 
strife since 1965 by Mining Exploration and Exploitation of Izabal 
(EXMIBAL).85 A significant cause of conflict is that nearly 400 km2 of the 
acquired land is located on indigenous historical land, which has led to 
massive forced displacements of indigenous peoples.86 In June 2008, Hudbay 
minerals bought Skye Resources; however, the tension over the project in the 
communities remained high. In addition to the land conflicts mentioned 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Gold and Silver Mining in Cerro Blanco (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras), ENVTL. JUST. 
ORGS., LIABILITIES & TRADE(Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/FS_005_Cerro_blanco.pdf. 
 80. Id.; INT’L BUS. PUBL’N, CENTRAL AMERICA MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, VOL. 1, 
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND REGULATIONS 35 (2015) [hereinafter CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL 
INDUSTRY HANDBOOK]. As of 2011, Cerro Blanco contained an estimated 39,500 kilograms (kg) of 
measured and indicated gold resources. Id. 
 81. Raising in Challenging Conditions at Cerro Blanco: Entre Mares Guatemala S.A. 
(Goldcorp), DUMAS MINING, 
http://www.dumasmining.com/Projects/InternationalProjects/CerroBlanco.aspx (last visited May 12, 
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 82. Fénix Project, Guatemala, MCGILL RES. GROUP INVESTIGATING CANADIAN MINING LATIN 
AMERICA, http://micla.ca/conflicts/fenix-project/ (last visited May 12, 2016). 
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 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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above, the communities claim they were never properly consulted.87 In 
August 2011, Hudbay divested itself of the Fenix project by selling it for 
$170 million to the Russian owned Solway Group.88 
The Escobal mine operates in San Rafael Las Flores and neighboring 
communities—Santa Rosa, the municipalities of Mataquescuintla and San 
Carlos Alzatate, Jalapa.89 This mine is fairly close to the city and consists of 
40 km2 to exploit gold, lead, zinc and other minerals.90 The exploitation 
license was granted to Tahoe Resources Inc. in April 2013.91 The mine is 
supposed to have 71.7 million ounces of recoverable silver, with a production 
rate of 20 million ounces per year at a cost of less than $3 per ounce.92 The 
region is generally poor,93 although there is agricultural and cattle industry in 
neighboring communities.94 This project will affect indigenous peoples, 
especially the Xinca.95 
In 2011, the subsidiary Exploraciones Mineras de Guatemala 
(Exmingua) of Radius Gold Inc. was granted a 20-km2 exploitation license 
in the municipalities of San Pedro Ayampuc and San José del Golfo, San 
Pedro Ayampuc.96 Not unlike other mines in Guatemala, this mine has 
transferred ownership several times during different phases of operation.97 
Most recently in 2012, Radius Gold sold 100% of its shares in this project to 
Kappes, Cassiday & Associates (KCA), a United States corporation.98 This 
project, known as El Tambor, is comprised of a concession of 20 km2 to 
exploit gold and silver.99 KCA’s own webpage projects that the mine will 
operate for five years and expects to mine 456 thousand tons of ore.100 San 
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Pedro is a largely indigenous community of Maya-Kakchikel, whereas San 
José del Golfo is predominantly Ladino.101 
B. The Environmental, Health, Property, and Social Effects of Metal 
Mining in Guatemala 
Metal mining firms “in Guatemala have fallen far short of environmental 
and social responsibility.”102 “Guatemala’s mix of lenient [laws and] policies 
and appropriate geology has made it a world epicenter of low-cost” metal 
mining production, which is happening largely in rural and indigenous 
communities and very close to residents of those communities.103 The result 
has been devastating environmental and social impacts, which have provoked 
an active anti-mining social movement that has precipitated repressive 
responses from the State.104 
1. Environmental and Health Impacts 
Mineral mining in Guatemala severely impacts the environment because 
mining companies chiefly engage in surface mining and direct cyanidation 
milling.105 This is because mineral deposits in both the Western Highlands 
and the East are relatively close to the surface.106 These types of deposits are 
the least expensive and the most environmentally destructive type of gold 
deposits to extract.107 All metal mining projects in Guatemala employ surface 
extraction and vat leaching cyanidation to mill the ore; some, such as the 
Marlin I mine, also employ underground extraction.108 
Gold mining, like all metal extraction operations, is inherently 
destructive of the local environment.109 Gold mining requires multiple, land-
degrading steps: (1) clearing vegetation and topsoil from large tracts of land; 
(2) blasting large open-pit mines and underground tunnels and hauling the 
waste rock into large nearby mounds or valleys; (3) excavating a massive 
amount of ore and pulverizing it into a fine powder; (4) treating the ore with 
                                                                                                                 
 101. For a detailed socioeconomic and cultural assessment of the communities affected by the El 
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 102. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 6. 
 103. Id. at 2. For example, the El Tambor mine is less than a mile away from all of the neighboring 
communities. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 42. 
 104. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 8. 
 105. Id. at 12. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 30. 
612 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 040:597 
 
a mix of water, lime, and sodium cyanide; (5) leaching the solution to 
separate the gold and sending it to a refining smelter, on- or off-site; and (6) 
channeling leftover tailings slurry to storage in a retention pond.110 The 
environment bears a heavy burden from the aforementioned steps in this 
extraction process. The initial clearing destroys productive topsoil and 
forests; dumping of waste rock into nearby areas destroys additional habitats; 
the use of explosives damages buildings and stresses wildlife and farm 
animals; smelting causes severe air pollution; acid mine drainage 
contaminates local waters with heavy metals such as aluminum, arsenic, 
cadmium, lead, nickel, and zinc that would have otherwise remained buried 
in intact rock; and the use of cyanide leachate, even diluted, can kill fish and 
sicken livestock.111 
Mining also poses environmental risks to water supply and water 
quality. The leaching process uses vast amounts of water, often in very dry 
environments.112 For example, Marlin I requires 250,000 liters of water per 
hour.113 A typical family in the area consumes approximately 30 liters a day. 
At that rate of consumption, it would take a family 22 years to use the same 
amount of water that the mining company uses in one hour.114 Consequently, 
some have expressed doubt about the feasibility of sharing water resources 
between the Marlin project and small farmers and residents of the area.115 
Toxic metals in water pose special risks given the absence of water 
infrastructure. Roughly half of the households near the Marlin I mine depend 
on ground and river water for drinking, crop irrigation, and livestock.116 The 
mine’s operations have led to major water contamination.117 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights concluded that technical studies 
demonstrate the presence of heavy metals such as iron, aluminum, 
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magnesium, and arsenic in local rivers, including the Tzala and Riachuelo, 
downstream of the tailings dam.118 
All of the environmental impacts described above have health 
consequences to humans and wildlife. Cyanide alone is acutely toxic to 
humans and wildlife and is an important part of the extraction of gold.119 
Inhalation of gaseous hydrogen cyanide of 100–300 parts per 
million (ppm) can lead to death within an hour, while exposures of 
20–40 ppm can lead to symptoms such as headache, weak and 
rapid pulse, nausea, and vomiting. Skin exposure to a hydrogen 
cyanide concentration of 100 milligrams per kilogram of body 
weight can be fatal. Lower concentrations can cause severe pain, 
burns, and deep ulcers that heal slowly.120 
These health impacts are worse in communities in close proximity to the 
mines in Guatemala.121 For several metals—lead in blood, and mercury, 
arsenic, copper, and zinc in urine—concentrations were higher in residents 
that lived closest to the mine (generally sites adjacent to or downstream from 
the mine) when compared to individuals living farther away.122 
2. Property Conflicts 
Guatemala has ceded the second-highest amount of square miles in 
mining concessions in Central America.123 Not surprisingly, this reality has 
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generated a number of complex property conflicts around metal mining in 
the country in both indigenous and non-indigenous communities. 
With regard to indigenous peoples, these include legal conflicts resulting 
from the State granting mining licenses without prior consultation from 
indigenous peoples in both communal lands and in lands that are still 
contested as communal but lack juridical certainty.124 Unfortunately, legal 
uncertainty over communal lands in Guatemala is common because of years 
of forced displacement of indigenous peoples, particularly during the civil 
war; agrarian conflicts; and the absence of a functioning land titling system 
in the country.125 In some cases, forced displacements have been caused 
directly by mining projects.126 Moreover, land policies adopted as part of the 
peace agreements have favored individual property rights over collective 
ones, the latter of which are not even formally recognized in Guatemala’s 
legal regime.127 Bad practices in mining companies’ acquisition of title have 
aggravated tensions. Mining companies have opted to negotiate with small 
private landholders of parcels adjacent to the mine without the involvement 
of the state or of local communities.128 They have engaged in these practices 
without even disclosing who they are and why the land is being acquired.129 
3. Social Impacts 
The human rights threatened by the work on the mines include rights to 
health; food and subsistence; access to lands and resources; and property; as 
well as human rights violations against women. Human rights violations 
from metal mining projects for indigenous peoples include: “(1) loss of 
traditional territories and land, eviction, migration and eventual resettlement; 
(2) depletion of resources necessary for physical and cultural survival; (3) 
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destruction and pollution of the traditional environment; (4) social and 
community disorganization; (5) long-term negative health and nutritional 
impacts; and (6) harassment and violence.”130 
The impacts of metal mining on indigenous peoples’ land and resources, 
food sources, and culture are devastating. These activities “have 
contaminated rivers, lakes, and other ground water; left toxic wastes that 
damage soils; driven away animals on which they depend for subsistence; 
and devastated local ecosystems.”131 These impacts have also impaired 
indigenous peoples’ human rights, including their rights to food and water 
and their right to a healthy environment.132 Moreover, extractive industry 
activities, including metal mining, “can result in dramatic loss of 
biodiversity” on the biodiversity-rich indigenous lands.133 The failure to 
respect indigenous peoples’ right to land is a violation of a right recognized 
under international law,134 and precipitates conflicts and violence.135 While 
states have the responsibility “to identify, demarcate, and protect indigenous 
peoples’ rights over their traditional lands, it is also the responsibility of 
companies to exercise due diligence and ascertain that there are no prior 
claims to lands and resources by indigenous peoples.”136 Failure to do so may 
result in “human rights violations where indigenous peoples assert their 
rights over lands they have traditionally occupied since time immemorial.”137 
The social organization of communities and their way of life is impacted 
by large-scale mining projects in many ways.138 Forced displacement 
disintegrates communities and social fabric and thus violates the right to the 
preservation of culture. Many residents in Guatemala anticipate future ill-
health and luck given that the degradation of mountains via mining activities 
conflicts with Mayans’ reverence of mountains and the ritualistic and 
spiritual role that mountains play in Mayan culture.139 In other indigenous 
communities plagued with toxic pollution, traditional outdoor activities, such 
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as hunting and medicine gathering, which play integral roles in the 
community’s culture, spirituality, economy, and diet, are limited.140 
The forced displacement of indigenous peoples from metal mining 
operations causes extensive cultural and spiritual impacts. “When a 
community is driven from their lands, losing all cultural reference points, and 
moves to an urban center where its members are marginalized, impoverished, 
discriminated against, and dispersed, there is inevitably and with time a 
forced assimilation into mainstream society.”141 Such displacement and 
assimilation can lead to a loss of values, customs, and languages in these 
indigenous communities, as well as erosion of social and political 
structures.142 Moreover, the lands that indigenous peoples traditionally 
occupy generally represent “their cultural identity, the spirits of ancestors, 
and sacred sites indispensable to their religious practices.”143 Consequently, 
“removal from that familiar landscape effectively denies them their religion 
and the specificity of their culture.”144 
Social conflicts around metal mining in Guatemala are commonplace145 
and surfaced around 2003 when it became clear that Guatemala intended to 
open up its territory to mega-development projects as a concerted strategy of 
development.146 These conflicts exist not only in the alliance between the 
State and the corporation against communities opposed to the mine, but also 
within communities and families.147 In Guatemala, conflicts around mining 
are intensified given the divergent and diverse perspectives on nature and 
natural resources between indigenous and non-indigenous communities.148 
Opposition to mining, however, is expressed by both the indigenous and non-
indigenous communities most affected by the activity. 
Mining conflicts in Guatemala between the affected communities and 
the State stem from several factors. These include the Mining Law, which 
prioritizes business interests over those of the community; weak institutions 
without the legitimacy to implement laws; a lack of transparency and 
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information about mining projects; a lack of meaningful consultation with 
the affected communities in the mining concessions; the environmental 
harms caused by mining; and the pre-existence and continuation of historical 
struggles related to land and water.149 
Community opposition to mining in Guatemala has involved resistance 
initiatives, which have turned violent when the State has intervened in an 
attempt to repress them.150 People have been killed, arrested, and raped while 
protesting the mine and in locally run referenda. Notable examples include 
the resistance to the Marlin I mine for more than a decade, which has turned 
violent.151 Anti-mining resistance against other mining projects has also 
turned violent. The oldest mine in Guatemala, El Estor, has reported grave 
violations of human rights linked to the mine since 2006. Some of these 
violations were filed as civil complaints against the company in Canadian 
courts.152 
In 2012, community members of San Pedro Ayampuc and San José del 
Golfo blocked the road to the mine as a resistance strategy against El Tambor 
mine.153They were able to stop the company’s machinery, even though 
hundreds of police agents accompanied the corporation.154 In May 2014, 
however, the government decided to remove protesters by force and several 
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were wounded.155 Violence has also affected the Escobal Mine in San Rafael, 
Las Flores, resulting in death. By 2013, the Guatemalan government declared 
states of emergency in some zones affected by protests against metal mining 
and hydroelectric projects, including San Rafael, Las Flores.156 In San Rafael, 
the state of emergency followed at least two deadly confrontations between 
anti-mining protestors and the mine.157 The plaintiffs attempted to seek 
justice in a Canadian court, but a judge of the British Columbia Supreme 
Court declined to take jurisdiction of their complaint.158 
Unfortunately, social tensions around mining have also led to a 
generalized climate of harassment, threats, attacks, criminalization, and even 
killings of human rights defenders. These defenders have played a key role 
in defending the rights of the affected communities.159 Arresting and bringing 
criminal charges against persons engaged in anti-mining resistance has 
become a strategy for delegitimizing any effort to stop mining operations.160 
Indigenous and non-indigenous leaders alike are labeled as terrorists or 
violent people stubbornly opposed to all development efforts in the country. 
Intra-community and intra-familial conflicts usually arise from 
inequalities created by a few employees earning higher wages. Higher wages 
improve the lives of the few who earn them but also increase prices for goods 
in the community, which further impoverishes others.161 Similar and even 
bigger impacts arise from the immigration of workers to the mine and the 
emigration patterns provoked by the mine. This dynamic not only yields 
                                                                                                                 
 155. AI MINING REPORT, supra note 74, at 17–18. In this area as well, Yolanda Oqueli, one of the 
protesters, received protective measures ordered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
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 159. Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 68. 
 160. EQUIPO REGIONAL DE MONITOREO Y DE ANÁLISIS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN 
CENTROAMÉRICA, INFORME SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y CONFLICTIVIDAD EN CENTROAMÉRICA 
2013–2014, at 40 (2014), http://www.fespad.org.sv/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Dddhh20141.pdf. 
 161. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 33. 
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demographic and cultural shifts, but also increases the demand for social 
services and infrastructure that are simply not there.162 
C. The Financial Benefits of Metal Mining: Who Profits and How Much?  
While metal mining in Guatemala is not big business, it is still a multi-
million dollar industry. For example, the overall mineral production in 
Guatemala in 2014 generated $765 million.163 In the last decade, mineral 
production in Guatemala has fluctuated year to year. This fluctuation, 
sometimes significant, occurs in response to factors such as changes in the 
price of metal, increases in mining activity, and social conflict. From 2004 to 
2011, Guatemala experienced exponential increases in mining production 
revenues from $9 million to $941 million.164 To date, 2011 represents a peak 
in mining production in Guatemala.  
However, in 2012, mining production dropped significantly to $596 
million.165 Two factors caused this decline in mining production. First, 
production at the Marlin I mine has slowed down considerably since all 
surface minerals were exhausted as of 2012 and only underground excavation 
is currently taking place.166 Second, in 2011, in response to significant social 
conflicts around metal mining, the government of Guatemala imposed a 
moratorium on mining licenses awaiting approval of a new mining law.167 
The moratorium, however, was lifted in 2012 without the approval of a new 
mining law. This lifting of the moratorium, and the increased production in 
the Escobal Mine in San Rafael, explains the recent increases in mining 
production in the last two years.168 
Unfortunately, Latin America in general, and Guatemalan people in 
particular, have failed to profit from their natural resources, except for the 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. at 32. 
 163. ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2014, supra note 44, at 6 (reporting that mineral production 
in Guatemala yielded 5,926.4 million Quetzales, which converts to approximately $765 million). 
 164. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2011, at 5 (2011), 
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economic elite.169 The true costs and benefits of mineral mining in Guatemala 
are uncertain due to a lack of knowledge and transparency about the industry. 
In general, the evidence suggests that economic growth is slower in mineral-
rich than mineral-poor countries, a phenomenon known as the “resource 
curse.”170 
The metal mining industry in Guatemala reflects the “resource curse” 
phenomenon. One explanation is based on the weak mining laws in the 
country, which fail both to capitalize adequately on the financial gains from 
metal mining and to fairly allocate the environmental costs produced from 
mining to the mining corporations.171 Moreover, elites appropriate mine 
royalties and other revenues for personal consumption. This money is not 
invested in building productive capacities that could capture and absorb 
potential spillovers.172 
For the Guatemalan elite, the expansion of mining presents a number of 
advantages. First, it provides direct fiscal revenue for the State.173 This is 
particularly important given how little the State collects in taxes. 
Guatemala’s tax revenues as a percentage of its GDP are among the lowest 
in the world, significantly below the Latin American average of 11.7%.174 As 
a result, more than 85% of Guatemala’s economy is based in the private 
sector, with the government contributing only about 13%.175 Guatemala’s 
share of metal mining profits is relatively small compared to other countries 
in the region.176 Nevertheless, the metal mining industry is still a significant 
taxpayer, even though it benefits from laws to avoid paying more taxes.177 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. at 52. See also ACQUATELLA, supra note 23, at 10. 
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 173. Id. at 14. 
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 176. For example, the Marlin I mine’s payment in 2010 in royalties and taxes was only about 15% 
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The Law for the Promotion of Development and Exports and of Manufacturing (Ley de Fomento y 
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note 25, at 58. 
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The highest tax rate paid by the industry has been less than 6%, which is 
lower than the average 10–11% that applies generally in the country.178 
Still, when considering all payments generated from mining, including 
royalties, taxes, and licensing fees, Guatemala’s total annual gain is 
significant. In the data provided by the Guatemalan government in its 2013 
annual report on mining, the fiscal benefits to the State from 2010 to 2013 
were as follows: $5.8 million in 2010, $9.5 million in 2011, $7.3 million in 
2012, and $6.3 million in 2013.179 These amounts do not include taxes on 
profit (calculated at 5% on gross sales or 31% over net gains), nor the 
voluntary royalties that mining companies have paid since 2012.180 
Moreover, in January 2012, 22 mining companies were reported to have 
agreed to increase royalties from 1 to4% for precious metals and from 1 to3% 
for non-precious metals, which would potentially yield an exponential 
increase of $64 million in revenues for Guatemala.181 These royalties are 
voluntary and cease when mineral prices drop below a certain level.182 
Interestingly, the government has not disclosed the revenues from mining in 
its annual reports since this agreement was reached. Perhaps because of this 
failure to disclose, Guatemala’s reported earnings from metal mining diverge 
significantly from those reported by the industry itself. According to the 
World Gold Council data, in 2013, Guatemala received $52 million in 
payments to the government.183 
In addition to public revenues, mining companies stimulate the economy 
in other ways. Mining companies source a number of goods and services in 
host countries, including machinery and equipment; energy and water; and 
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construction, transport, and food services.184 These procurement profits 
dwarf payments in royalties and taxes.185 
According to one study, procurement benefits that go directly to 
businesses and contractors constituted nearly two-thirds of the total 
economic gains from mining in 2013.186 These procurement gains are 
typically substantial in the national economy but provide limited benefits to 
the localities.187 Mining also offers other macroeconomic benefits such as 
export earnings, high-paying jobs, and technology and knowledge 
spillovers.188 Metal mining produces few direct jobs but the average wage is 
more than double that in manufacturing and triple that in agriculture.189 
Moreover, an important indirect benefit from metal mining is the creation of 
indirect jobs.190 Finally, although social investment by mining companies is 
low,191 there are some gains for local communities.192 When all of these 
contributions are calculated, they can be substantial.193 
However, there are three significant reasons why the economic gains 
from metal mining in Guatemala do not represent a good investment for the 
country. First, few of these gains ever reach the majority of Guatemalans. 
Royalties and all other revenues generated from mining go into the general 
public funds. This allocation of funds makes it impossible to tell how the 
State spends the revenue. Rampant corruption in Guatemala, and a lack of 
                                                                                                                 
 184. “According to the Guatemalan think tank CIEN, for every 100 quetzales worth of production, 
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transparency in public spending laws and practices, guarantee poor 
accounting regarding how national and local governments spend the funds.194 
There is little evidence that much of these monies have been invested in 
public goods such as education, health, and infrastructure.195 
Second, environmental and social harms significantly outweigh any 
economic benefit, not only over the lifetime of the mine, but also in the post-
closure phase.196 As documented in Part I.B. of this article, there are 
significant property, environmental, and economic harms from metal mining, 
especially to local residents.197 While these costs are difficult to calculate, a 
few studies suggest that they are much higher than the economic benefits that 
metal mining provides.198 One reason for this reality is that under current 
Guatemalan law, mining companies bear little to no responsibility for 
repairing or mitigating environmental harms to communities.199 
Third, the current political structure unfairly forces local communities 
where mining occurs to bear the impacts from mining, while almost all 
economic gains from the activity are centralized. According to one study in 
2009, over 90% of all economic gains from metal mining flowed to the 
national government or to workers and businesses outside of the local 
communities affected by mining.200 In Guatemala, this is particularly 
egregious because these rural communities, comprised largely of indigenous 
populations, have principally experienced oppression or abandonment by the 
central government.201 Moreover, these mining projects have been imposed 
on these communities despite their strong opposition to metal mining in their 
territories.202 However, local communities are not doing any better than the 
government in managing the funds they are receiving from mining. It is not 
clear how local communities are spending their royalty money, though most 
report it is principally going to infrastructure projects benefitting the mine 
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itself.203 It also does not appear that local governments, with some 
exceptions, are engaged in sustainable projects expected to last beyond the 
projected duration of the mine.204 
II. THE METAL MINING REGIME IN GUATEMALA 
 Legal reforms, either to the Mining Law itself or to water and 
consultation laws, are necessary to improve the way mining is conducted in 
Guatemala. But legal reforms alone will not suffice. Guatemala’s challenges 
with mining are structural and political. Guatemala’s weak democracy 
reveals itself in its ineffective institutions and its corrupt political actors who 
are not accountable to the people and to the public good. Part II of this Article 
attempts to explain the challenging landscape that hampers the effective 
regulation of metal mining in Guatemala. 
A. The 1985 Constitution and Norms Relevant to Natural Resources 
The 1985 Guatemalan Constitution, which still governs today, is a fairly 
progressive document. Notably, it includes provisions governing 
environmental and human rights.205 The weakness has been in its 
implementation. Laws adopted subsequent to the Guatemalan Constitution 
have prioritized provisions that encourage development and foreign 
investment over provisions that protect the environment, natural resources, 
or human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples. Moreover, poor 
funding, political marginalization, and decentralization weaken the state 
institutions charged with enforcing environmental norms and human rights 
affected by the exploitation of natural resources.206 
Regarding natural resources, Article 121 of the Guatemalan Constitution 
declares that the subsoil and any minerals, hydrocarbons, or other organic or 
inorganic substances are the property of the State.207 Article 125 of the 
Guatemalan Constitution declares that the technical and rational exploitation 
of hydrocarbons, minerals, and other non-renewable natural resources is of 
public utility and need and further that the State will establish and propriate 
its own conditions for their exploration, exploitation, and 
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commercialization.208 Thus, the Guatemalan Constitution centralizes 
decisions governing natural resources exclusively in the national 
government, not localities. In fact, Guatemala’s Constitution only recognizes 
decentralized powers when these have been expressly delegated to localities 
by two-thirds of the Congress.209 The Guatemalan Congress has adopted laws 
that promote decentralization specifically to promote regional economic 
development and indigenous peoples’ self-determination.210 Moreover, 
Article 173 of the Guatemalan Constitution establishes a right to a 
referendum procedure whenever there are political decisions of special 
significance.211 Some have suggested that the nature and scope of mining in 
Guatemala warrants a referendum.212 However, in practice, mining decisions 
have been the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government. 
Guatemala’s Constitution also contains a number of important 
fundamental rights that are linked to environmental protection. To the extent 
that environmental preservation is linked to the protection of life, Articles 1–
3 of the Guatemalan Constitution, which protect human life, can also be said 
to pertain to environmental protection.213 In addition, if the right to health is 
linked to environmental protection, then Articles 93 and 98 of the 
Guatemalan Constitution are also relevant.214 Article 64 governs per se 
environmental protection. That Article establishes that the State shall 
conserve, protect, and improve the natural resources that belong to the 
people.215 As such, it requires the State to adopt laws creating national parks 
and protected areas.216 
In addition, Article 97 obligates the State at all levels and throughout the 
national territory to promote social, economic, and technological 
development that would prevent contamination of the environment and 
maintain ecological balance.217 To support this objective, the State is 
obligated to issue the necessary regulations to guarantee that use of the fauna, 
flora, land, and water may be realized rationally, preventing their 
depredation.218 Article 126, in turn, declares the urgent public need for 
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reforestation and for the special protection of forest and vegetation on the 
banks of rivers and lakes.219 Finally, Article 127 declares that water is a 
public good and an inalienable right. Furthermore, Article 127 declares that 
the law should govern water’s use.220 
Guatemala’s Constitution also contains other important provisions 
addressing the right to property, cultural rights, and the rights of indigenous 
peoples. These provisions are relevant to regulating mining. For example, 
Article 64 protects the national heritage and establishes a state duty to protect 
natural sanctuaries.221 Article 67 governs the protection of indigenous 
agricultural lands,222 while Article 39 protects property as an inherent right 
and requires the State to create the conditions necessary to enable owners to 
use and enjoy their property.223 Many of these same rights are protected in 
international human rights treaties ratified by Guatemala, which under 
Article 46 of the Guatemalan Constitution are declared to have preeminence 
over internal laws.224 
B. The 1997 Mining Law 
Guatemala’s Mining Law was adopted in 1997; a year after Guatemala 
signed the peace agreements ending its civil war.225 Then-President Álvaro 
Arzú, a businessman who represented the transition from a military to a civil, 
business-friendly government, simultaneously privatized the 
telecommunications industry, railroads, and the energy sector. Arzú devised 
the new mining and investment law as a strategy to attract foreign capital and 
jump start the Guatemalan economy.226 Privatization was a strategy 
throughout Central America, which spurred a race to the bottom between 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to outbid one another for foreign 
investment in mining and energy.227 
The first of the two most important changes to the Mining Law  was the 
end to the proscription against 100% foreign ownership of mining 
enterprises. The next important change was the reduction of royalties on 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at art. 126. 
 220. Id. at art. 127. 
 221. Id. at art. 64. 
 222. Id. at art. 67. 
 223. Id. at art. 39. 
 224. Id. at art. 46. The most important international treaty pertaining to metal mining in Guatemala 
is ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 225. Mining Law, supra note 64. 
 226. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 9. 
 227. Id. at 10. 
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gross revenues to the government from 6% to 1%, to be shared equally 
between the central and municipal governments.228 This 1% royalty became 
the lowest in the region, lower than the 3% adopted by El Salvador a year 
earlier.229 In addition, mining corporations are exempted from paying various 
taxes, including taxes on water use or on imported machinery.230 
The 1997 Mining Law is also notable for what it did not include. One 
significant omission pertained to the relationship between the extraction of 
natural resources in indigenous territories and the rights of indigenous 
peoples. In 1995, as part of the peace agreements, Guatemala signed the 
Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples.231 In 1996, 
Guatemala ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 
169.232 Each of these instruments was critical to ensure that development did 
not undermine the sovereignty or infringe the fundamental rights of 
indigenous peoples.  
Yet the Mining Law does not include provisions requiring free, prior, 
and informed consent. Also, it does not recognize indigenous peoples’ 
collective land rights or their cultural attachment to ancestral territories and 
natural resources. Quite the contrary, the Mining Law prescribes favorable 
easements in public and private property to permit mining activities. For 
public lands, it requires only prior consent from the responsible government 
agency, which the Law says should cooperate to grant the easement.233 On 
private lands, a mining company may either negotiate agreements with the 
private owners, subject only to arbitration to resolve disputes,234 or may 
compel such agreements simply by going to a trial judge whose decision is 
not subject to appeal.235 The Mining Law also does not exempt protected 
areas from mining activities. 
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The Mining Law is extremely weak in its environmental requirements 
and contains notable omissions. The Law designates MEM to regulate 
mining in the country and to issue licenses.236 Mining licenses require that 
the petitioning company submit a “mitigation study” but fail to define or 
provide standards for such studies, except to establish that MEM must rule 
on the sufficiency of the study within 30 days. If MEM does not rule within 
the 30-day period, the study becomes approved by law.237 The company must 
also submit an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to the Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) (formerly known as the 
National Commission of the Environment) and, when mining occurs in 
protected areas, the company must also submit an EIA to the National 
Council of Protected Areas (CONAVI).238 
The Mining Law, however, fails to provide standards or procedures for 
assessing the EIA or to establish monitoring mechanisms, except to state that 
the EIA must be resolved within 30 days.239 The accompanying regulations 
adopted in 2001 also failed to specify greater substantive norms and 
procedures for approving the EIA.240 
Several amendments in 2003, 2007, 2010, and 2015 improved the 
procedures.241 In general, the standards adopt three levels of environmental 
impact assessment. Category A has a set of procedures and applies to projects 
likely to have a high environmental impact.242 These standards establish and 
define the scope of the technical instruments mining companies must submit 
for an EIA evaluation. The standards include an evaluation of environmental 
and social impacts,243 and prescribe monitoring steps, including audits, which 
MARN must undertake to ensure compliance.244 The new standards permit 
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MARN to seek input from private and public entities, and mandate that 
MARN consult the National Commission on Protected Areas when mining 
projects occur in protected areas.245 
The standards also require the reasons for denial of an EIA petition, 
including when the negative environmental impacts outweigh the benefits of 
the project, or when MARN inspectors have been denied access to the area.246 
The new standards also demand that MARN determine the payment of a bond 
in case the mine closes. MARN may also determine a separate amount of 
necessary insurance coverage for environmental risks.247 Finally, the 
standards regulate sanctions and fines for non-compliance, though in general 
these tend to be low.248 
These standards are not adequately enforced due to political and 
economic constraints. MARN has faced political pressure under different 
administrations to ensure that metal mining projects are not rejected based 
on environmental impact assessments.249 MARN is significantly 
understaffed, underfunded, ill-equipped, and politically marginalized in 
contrast to MEM, which is eager to promote mining investment.250 Critics 
have noted that MARN cannot—and does not—undertake the control and 
monitoring of the EIAs that these projects require.251 The agency spends most 
of its limited resources on the bureaucratic process of approving mining 
licenses and does almost nothing to provide ongoing oversight and 
accountability for non-compliance after approval.252 
Unfortunately, MARN’s weakness in the EIA process has meant that 
mining companies can manage concerns over environmental harms by 
controlling the environmental impact studies.253 For example, the Marlin I 
mine continues to operate despite significant weaknesses in the EIA process 
revealed by the IFC and other independent assessments.254 Calls by the ILO 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. at art. 17. 
 246. Id. at art. 19. 
 247. Id. at art. 5664, art. 8082. 
 248. Id. at art. 8894. 
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mining projects). 
 250. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 24–25. 
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 254. Id. at 35. In 2005, the Marlin I mine’s own IFC Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) 
found that “the [EIA] prepared by Glamis failed to identify all water users downstream from the mine, 
fully assess the potential for acid mine drainage, fully assess the potential for other water contaminants, 
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and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to suspend the Marlin 
I mine only led to an administrative process and an inter-ministerial 
investigation of impacts. Ultimately, that process concluded that the mine did 
not pose a threat to community water supplies or human health.255 Similarly, 
other experts have singled out the EIA study for the El Tambor mine and 
determined that it was significantly lacking.256 Other experts have diverged 
significantly from the official EIA approved by MARN to find that the El 
Tambor mine will have significant ill effects on the environment, including 
on water depletion and contamination.257 
Aside from the mitigation and environmental impact requirements, the 
Mining Law does not require reclamation upon completion of mining 
operations. Mining reclamation, which seeks to minimize or mitigate the 
environmental effects of mining, is supposed to be a regular part of modern 
mining practices.258 Either during mining operations or after they cease, 
reclamation involves restoring mined land to a natural or economically 
usable condition.259 
Article 66 establishes a nominal fee for opting to transfer an exploration 
or exploitation license;260 however, it is silent as to whether that transfer can 
                                                                                                                 
In 2010, the U.S.-based consulting firm E-Tech International produced a 
comprehensive evaluation of predicted and actual water quality around the mine. 
The report found that the [EIA] “provided limited information on the baseline 
environmental setting in and around the Marlin Mine” and should have included 
more information about “water quality, water quantity and levels, and the 
abundance and health of aquatic biota.” . . . The review also found that the [EIA] 
provided no evidence to support its claim that the “acid generation and contaminant 
leaching potential of the rocks [were] low.” . . . The lack of adequate baseline data 
continues to impede environmental and health oversight. 
Id. at 35 (internal citations omitted) (quoting E-TECH INT’L, EVALUATION OF PREDICTED AND ACTUAL 
WATER QUALITY AT THE MARLIN MINE, GUATEMALA 5–6 (2010), 
http://www.etechinternational.org/guatemala/ (follow link to “Download” under “Final Report”). 
 255. Id. at 12. 
 256. As Yagenova explains, the study was conducted by the Grupo Sierra Madre Internacional 
S.A. Yagenova questions their independence given that they are paid by the mining company to conduct 
the study. Moreover, an independent assessment of the EIA conducted by American environmental 
engineers Dr. Robert Robinson and Dr. Robert Durán found several deficiencies, including that water 
usage only focuses on access to water for mining and not on its effects on neighboring communities, and 
that monitoring plans are extremely vague as are recovery plans after the mine’s closure. Yagenova, supra 
note 97, at 35–36, 41–42. 
 257. Id. at 45–46. 
 258. See, e.g., What Happens to Mine Sites after a Mine is Closed?, MININGFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.miningfacts.org/environment/what-happens-to-mine-sites-after-a-mine-is-closed/ (last 
visited May 15, 2016). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Article 66 establishes a fee from between three to nine units during each year that they hold 
an exploration license, as well as a fee of three units per km2 for ending or transferring an exploration 
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simply be back to the government. Article 71, which governs water 
contamination, requires that those who make use of water in their mining 
operations must adequately treat the water to avoid environmental 
contamination.261 Any regulation of the abandonment or closure of a mine is 
done indirectly through the EIA and mitigation studies. Nothing in the law 
requires MARN or the holder of the license to comply with the promises or 
commitments made in the original licensing agreement.262 
Not surprisingly, mining reclamation practices in Guatemala have been 
poorly managed. For example, Montana Exploradora Mine provided a $1 
million dollar surety bond to be used to reclaim the mine in the event of a 
company default.263 This amount is trivial compared to reclamation bonds 
required of mining operations in developed nations264 and is vastly 
inadequate for the scope of the mining project.265 The insufficient surety 
funds for the Marlin I mine expose the government, local residents, and the 
environment to significant risks if the company fails to properly reclaim the 
mine. These risks include ongoing pollution from acidic toxic metals, erosion 
and sedimentation, and altered lands that cannot be returned to prior uses.266 
Article 51 of the Mining Law does, however, regulate the involuntary 
suspension of a mining project. The suspension grounds include: (a) when 
there is imminent risk or danger to life or property; (b) when labor security 
has been violated; (c) when environmental laws have been violated; (d) when 
the subsoil fee has not been paid; (e) when royalties have not been paid; (f) 
for non-compliance with Article 85 of the law (a requirement that those who 
export mining products have a license to do so); (g) failure to submit reports 
required by law; and (h) when what has been approved for exploitation and 
what is actually being exploited are not proportionate.267 Although Article 51 
contemplates suspension based on significant personal or property harms and 
                                                                                                                 
license and five units per km2 for ending or transferring an exploitation license. Article 67 clarifies that 
one unit can mean from 100 quetzales (about $12) to about 1000 quetzales (about $130), as established 
by MEM. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 66–67. 
 261. Id. at art. 71. 
 262. IARNA, supra note 3, at 203. 
 263. KEITH CAMPBELL ET AL., RECLAMATION ISSUES AND ESTIMATED COST OF RECLAMATION 
MARLIN MINE, at 1 (Molly Butler et al. trans., 2011), 
https://goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/reclamation-issues-and-estimated-cost-of-
reclamation-marlin-mine.pdf. 
 264. Id. (providing four examples of reclamation fees at mines in Colorado that range from $7.4 
million all the way to $99 million dollars). 
 265. Id. at 9–12 (estimating that the surety bond should be $49 million dollars (or approximately 
389 million quetzales) to cover such costs as surface water treatment, removing and recovering land and 
revegetation, demolition and removal of buildings, and erosion control). 
 266. Id. at 1. 
 267. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 51. 
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based on violations to the environmental laws, its effectiveness is limited by 
weak enforcement as MEM is perceived to be deeply biased in favor of 
mining enterprises.268 
The other significant weakness of the Mining Law pertains to public 
participation. The only mention of public participation in the law is found in 
Article 46, which governs procedures for stating opposition to a mine. Article 
46 merely requires that opposition must be submitted prior to the issuance of 
the license and has to be based on failure to comply with Article 41.269 Article 
41 lists the formal requirements for obtaining a license, such as the names 
and citizenship or passport information of those seeking the license, 
specification of the territory, and type of activity sought.270 It does not 
mention mitigation or environmental impact studies.  
The most recent 2015 governmental decree, however, has improved the 
opportunity for public participation in the EIA, at least in theory. The process 
is supposed to involve a public notice of the EIA study of at least 20 days, 
during which time the public may express its opposition.271 Unfortunately, 
the method chosen to provide this notice—a written notification in a public 
newspaper—is not effective in communities where many residents do not 
read. Notably, a reform to include such an announcement on the radio and in 
indigenous languages was expressly rejected in the promulgation of recent 
regulations.272 
The new regulations also include other good practices that are not 
implemented because of MARN’s limited resources. First, the EIA must post 
its resolution of the EIA online, in Spanish, and in the predominant local 
languages.273 In practice, this mandate is not met. In a recent interview with 
MARN officials, we confirmed that their distribution practice remains 
unchanged despite the new regulations.274 Second, MARN must make public 
a highly technical document—that few can understand—in Spanish for 20 
days solely in its offices in Guatemala City.275 Unfortunately, these existing 
procedures for public participation simply do not work. In fact, it is not 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See, e.g., Aldana, supra note 128, at 82–85 (explaining how it is critical to account for the 
political forces that dictate “action or inaction in a given case”). 
 269. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 46. 
 270. Id. at art. 41. 
 271. MARN Governmental Decree, supra note 242, at art. 32. 
 272. Interview with MARN official, Guatemala (July 2015). 
 273. MARN Governmental Decree, supra note 242, at art. 31. 
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uncommon for communities affected by mining to learn about projects in 
their communities when the machinery appears.276 
C. Guatemala’s Environmental Laws 
Guatemala’s environmental legal regime is weak and largely 
decentralized. The problem is not so much an absence of laws277—although 
there are some important gaps discussed in Part II.D below—but rather 
numerous institutions with overlapping mandates and little coordination that 
are overworked and under-resourced.278 Moreover, there is simply no 
political will to enforce environmental laws that apply to mining activities; 
including laws regulating deforestation, protected areas, biodiversity, and 
water.279 
For nearly 20 years from the adoption of Guatemala’s constitution 
establishing the modern environmental regime, the environmental laws have 
been dedicated nearly exclusively to regulating protected areas and 
biodiversity. This is, in part, a response to priorities established by funders, 
such as USAID, and foreign environmental nongovernmental groups.280 In 
the last decade, however, environmental laws have shifted away from 
protected areas to address deforestation and climate change.281 Despite these 
gains in some areas of environmental law, robust application of these laws to 
mining is not contemplated. 
Technically, the general Law on the Protection and Improvement of the 
Environment282 and its regulations are supposed to apply to mining activities 
in Guatemala.283 This Law contains several provisions that should regulate 
the adverse environmental consequences of mining. The Law, for example, 
calls for the rational use of natural resources in the subsoil in order to prevent 
                                                                                                                 
 276. Id. at 64–65 (explaining that 14 years after the State first granted a license of 
acknowledgment to Glamis Gold and even months after the exploitation license was approved, the MEM 
finally admitted to the community that a mining license existed in the region). 
 277. Yagenova states that since 1930, more than 1,200 environmental laws and regulations have 
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 278. Id. 
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 280. Mario Mancilla, Algunos Antecedentes y Estructura del Derecho Ambiental en Guatemala 
910 (2015) (unpublished thesis, Universidad Pontifica de Salamanca Spain) (on file with author). 
 281. Id. at 10. 
 282. Ley de Protección y Mejoramiento del Medio Ambiente, Decreto Número 68-
86,http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Guatemala/GT_Ley_Proteccion_Medio_Ambi
ente_68_86.pdf. 
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contamination and achieve ecological balance.284 It prohibits the storage of 
toxic waste likely to contaminate the environment.285 It requires an 
environmental impact assessment prior to the approval of any development 
project likely to deplete natural resources.286 It calls for the regulation of 
water access and quality.287 When read in conjunction with the Mining Law, 
however, it is vague in determining, assessing, and imposing sanctions based 
on environmental harms caused by mining.288 
Moreover, MARN, which is charged with enforcement, is too weak and 
is often undermined by MEM. Mining companies seize on these weaknesses 
to ignore environmental sanctions, even when they are imposed.289 MARN 
is only involved in mining concessions too late in the process—after the 
exploration phase, when it is clear that MEM has decided to push forward 
with the project.290 MARN has no role in the mitigation impact study, which 
is solely approved by MEM during the exploration phases of a mining 
project.291 Also, the Mining Law does not even exclude mining from 
protected areas. Finally, Guatemala’s Criminal Code penalizes certain 
environmental crimes where actions result in the intentional destruction of 
publicly-owned natural resources and goods. These crimes include the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources, illegal deforestation, and the destruction of 
protected species.292 The codification of these crimes, however, has not 
resulted in prosecutions because prosecutors often rely on MEM for its 
technical evidentiary findings and often dismiss cases based on lack of 
proof.293 
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 285. Id. at art. 6. 
 286. Id. at art. 8. 
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D. Governance Gaps 
1. Water Usage and Water Quality 
There is a provision in the 1985 Constitution stating that water is an 
inalienable right the use of which should be regulated by law.294 But 
Guatemala has yet to adopt a water law, despite several attempts to do so.295 
The absence of water laws and regulations in the country means that issues 
such as access to water, water usage, and water contamination from mining 
activities are left entirely unregulated.296 Indeed, in Guatemala, and 
throughout Latin America, a principal cause of water conflict is not 
necessarily water scarcity, but rather unregulated and unsustainable use of 
water for commercial purposes.297 The extractive industry produces two 
types of problems for Guatemala: excessive uses of water and water 
contamination.298 Moreover, mining’s reliance on large bodies of water 
means that mining companies strategically place mining operations near 
water basins. This puts pressure on that water, which is felt by several 
communities that depend on that water source.299 
There are a few provisions in existing laws that Guatemala could use to 
regulate mining companies’ water use. Guatemala’s Mining Law grants those 
who have acquired mining licenses the right to make rational use of water as 
long as it does not affect the permanent exercise of other rights. The Law also 
establishes that waters running in their natural riverbeds or found in lagoons 
that are not in public domain or common usage shall be regulated by the Civil 
Code and other relevant laws.300 However, these norms are not implemented. 
MARN also sets standards for water quality, but enforcement is lagging 
because MARN does not regularly monitor water quality.301 
A significant ruling of the Guatemalan Constitutional Court on 
September 28, 2015 revealed the promise and perils of water law as applied 
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to mining, however, strong pronouncements of law yield little effect when 
implemented by weak institutions.302 The ruling established a novel 
precedent by declaring water a fundamental human right that requires 
prioritizing human consumption of water over commercial uses.303 The ruling 
resulted from a challenge to the El Escobal mining license concession 
alleging that mining threatened to significantly contaminate water quality.304 
While the Constitutional Court seriously considered the challenge, the Court 
could not verify its factual veracity because MARN had not monitored the 
mine since its operation began two years earlier.305 The insufficient record 
prevented the Court from granting the claimant’s requested remedy—the 
suspension of the mine.306 Instead, the Court simply ordered MARN to do its 
job and assess the degree to which mining affected water access and quality 
in the affected communities.307 The impact of this ruling is not yet known 
and is likely to be negatively affected by the political transition in the 
country.308 
2. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent 
In Guatemala, the right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) with 
respect to metal mining suffers from an implementation gap. This gap results 
from a lack of political will to determine the nature and scope of this right. 
Guatemala has a legal regime governing the consultative process that could 
be implemented effectively. But this legal regime requires further regulations 
and clarity, which the State has refused to provide. As a result, there is 
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significant uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of FPIC. Unresolved 
conflicts pertaining to non-renewable resources especially exacerbate this 
uncertainty problem. There are three groups competing for rights related to 
exploiting non-renewable resources: (1) the central government under its 
exclusive constitutional authority to extract resources; (2) the localities under 
decentralized forms of government to control their own natural resources and 
territory; and (3) indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC under ILO Convention 
169. 
Guatemala’s failure to conduct local consultations following its own 
legal procedures increases legal uncertainty. With some exceptions in a few 
localities, the State refuses to engage in consultative processes.309 This 
failure, in turn, causes mining corporations and those opposed to mining to 
fill this void. Predictably, this process yields tremendous confusion and 
uncertainty around the consultative process and renders the process legally 
ineffective. The affected communities, which are largely opposed to mining, 
question the legitimacy of consultative processes initiated by private 
corporations.310 Likewise, mining corporations and the central government 
often challenge the legality of local community-led consultation procedures 
in subsequent litigation. 
A helpful starting point in addressing this scenario is the existing legal 
framework pertaining to indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC. This right is 
distinct from consultation laws that apply to non-indigenous communities. 
The principal reason for this distinction is that Guatemala ratified ILO 
Convention 169 in 1996, a convention that applies only to indigenous and 
tribal peoples and governs the consultative process.311 Moreover, Article 46 
of Guatemala’s Constitution312 establishes the preeminence of international 
human rights norms, which means ILO Convention 169 is not only a binding 
convention, but a fundamental constitutional right. Indeed, in 1995, 
Guatemala’s Constitutional Court issued an advisory opinion requested by 
the Guatemalan Congress finding that ILO Convention 169 is a human rights 
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instrument as contemplated in Article 46 of the Guatemalan Constitution, and 
that none of its provisions conflict with the Guatemalan Constitution.313 
Guatemala enacted laws governing the consultative process, some of 
which predate the country’s ratification of ILO 169, but there is a great deal 
of uncertainty regarding these laws. The conflict lies in the laws’ hierarchical 
value over other potentially conflicting norms, their normative vagueness, 
and potential inconsistency with international obligations, at least in how 
these laws pertain to indigenous peoples. Substantial non-implementation of 
these laws is also a problem. This landscape provoked a chorus of 
international governmental institutions to conclude that Guatemala is not 
respecting indigenous peoples’ rights to FPIC.314 
Before examining Guatemala’s domestic laws, the nature and scope of 
ILO 169’s requirements must be considered. Article 6 of ILO 169 requires 
states to consult “the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and 
in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration 
is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect 
them directly.”315 This consultation shall be undertaken “in good faith and in 
a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent to the proposed measures.”316 The provision 
implements procedural safeguards (by requiring the involvement of 
representative institutions) to conduct consultative processes through 
appropriate procedures.317 The institutions shall conduct the consultations in 
good faith with the objective of reaching a substantive goal, consensus, to 
safeguard indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.318 
Under international law, the procedural and substantive goals of Article 
6 mean that States must consult indigenous peoples to obtain their consent.319 
Prior consent is actually required before a state can undertake activities or 
measures that are likely to impact indigenous peoples’ rights over their lands 
and natural resources.320 This consent goal includes development projects at 
a grand scale likely to have a major impact on the physical and cultural 
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survival of indigenous peoples.321 Indeed, such projects require, as part of the 
consultative requirements, commitments to execute environmental and social 
impact assessments by independent and competent bodies, and a guarantee 
that the affected indigenous peoples will receive a reasonable share of the 
profits.322 
Nevertheless, prior consent does not require a referendum process that 
calls for a vote on development projects. Procedurally, Article 6 
contemplates a process of dialogue and negotiation between the State and 
indigenous communities, executed in good faith with the goal of reaching 
consensus.323 While ideally the end result of this process is full agreement, 
failure to reach such an outcome does not violate Article 6.324 Partial 
agreement to key aspects can suffice, and sometimes the State can proceed 
without reaching consensus.325 In such cases, however, the State bears the 
burden of justifying why agreement was not possible, and the State is still 
obligated to execute the project in ways that protect or repair any harms to 
the substantive rights of indigenous peoples.326 
Guatemala’s laws that seek to fulfill the consultation requirements in 
metal mining projects do not conformprocedurally or substantivelyto 
ILO 169. Procedurally, Guatemala’s laws contemplate an up-or-down 
referendum process instead of meaningful dialogue and do not contemplate 
environmental impact assessments or profit-sharing as part of the necessary 
requirements.327 By ignoring overwhelming expressions of disapproval by 
local communities attempting to engage in referenda, Guatemala is not acting 
in good faith to achieve consensus. Many mining projects have violated the 
substantive rights of indigenous peoples with little regard for amelioration or 
reparations. 
Several Guatemalan laws require consultation with local communities 
on development projects. These laws, adopted in 2002, are the Law of the 
Councils on Urban and Rural Development (Law of the Councils),328 the 
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Municipal Code,329 and the General Law on Decentralization.330 These laws 
establish a process for consulting with indigenous authorities, local 
communities, or both. The Law of the Councils mirrors the constitutional 
obligation to promote administrative, economic decentralization in order to 
achieve adequate regional development of the country.331 The Law of the 
Councils establishes the principal means by which Mayan, Xinca, Garífona, 
and non-indigenous peoples of Guatemala can engage in democratic 
participation in development projects, taking into account the country’s 
multi-ethnic and multi-lingual characteristics.332 The Councils are formed at 
five different levels of government: national, regional, departmental, 
municipal, and community.333 In communities where there is indigenous 
presence, the law explicitly requires participation of indigenous leaders 
elected in accordance with the customary practices of each community.334 
Councils are expected to work toward ensuring greater decentralization in 
development decisions.335 Among the Councils’ principles are respecting 
different Guatemalan cultures, promoting inter-cultural harmony, and 
seeking balance between the environment and human development.336 
Article 26 of this Law is the only provision expressly regulating 
consultations, and it is limited to the participation of indigenous 
communities.337 Moreover, the law appears to create solely a permissive—
not obligatory—procedural mechanism for consultation. It does not clarify 
either procedural mechanisms or safeguards for participation, nor does it give 
legal recognition or effect to the process.338 In this way, Article 26 does not 
appear to conform to ILO Convention 169. 
The General Law on Decentralization similarly contemplates ample 
community participation in prioritizing public projects and distributing 
                                                                                                                 
 329. Código Municipal de Guatemala, Decreto Numero 12-2002, art. 65 (2002), 
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2002/gtdcx12-2002.pdf [hereinafter Municipal Code of 
Guatemala]. 
 330. Ley General de Decentralización, Decreto Numero 14-2002 (2002), 
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2002/gtdcx14-2002.pdf. 
 331. Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural, Decreto Numero 11-2002, pmbl. (citing 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 119(b), 224). 
 332. Id. at art. 1. 
 333. Id. at art. 4. 
 334. Id. at art. 23. 
 335. Id. at art. 8–14. 
 336. Id. at art. 26. 
 337. “Consultation with Indigenous Peoples. Until a law is passed that regulates consultation with 
the Maya, Garífona and Xinca indigenous peoples with regard to development projects promoted by the 
Executive Branch that affect directly these communities, consultation may be implemented by means of 
the representatives in the development councils.” Id. (translation by author). 
 338. Id. 
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public funds.339 The Law’s guiding principles include respect for municipal 
sovereignty; the promotion of citizenship participation through dialogue and 
negotiation; and the preservation of environmental equilibrium and human 
development.340 The Law’s objectives include increasing local management 
of a sustainable environment and reinforcing the identity and organization of 
communities.341 Specifically for mining projects, Article 18 provides that 
community organizations (recognized by law) shall participate in executing 
public projects, programs, and services with the municipal authorities.342 
Finally, the Municipal Code similarly promotes a decentralized 
government, which is a response to the need to recognize Guatemala as a 
multi-lingual and multi-cultural society.343 The Code gives municipalities the 
ability to administer municipal funds––including the 0.5% royalties paid by 
mining companies—preserves and promotes the cultural identity, and 
protects renewable and non-renewable natural resources.344 The municipal 
government is different from indigenous forms of government. In 
Guatemala, indigenous leaders coexist parallel to the official leaders of the 
municipality.345 Although the Municipal Code recognizes this coexistence, it 
does not dictate a specific form of relationship; rather, the Code suggests that 
the relationship be determined locally, and according to practice.346 The Code 
expressly mentions indigenous, communitarian, and auxiliary municipal 
forms of government.347 Furthermore, the Code states that the official 
municipality must recognize and respect these governmental forms.348 
Communitarian and auxiliary municipal forms of government, defined as 
customary forms of local governance, are also charged with overseeing the 
protection of renewable and non-renewable resources in their jurisdiction.349 
In practice, the official municipal government receives and controls all local 
                                                                                                                 
 339. Id. at art. 2. 
 340. Id. at art. 4. 
 341. Id. at art. 6. 
 342. Id. at art. 18. 
 343. Municipal Code of Guatemala, supra note 330, at pmbl. 
 344. Id. at art. 35. 
 345. See generally Carlos Fredy Ochoa, Trayectoria Histórica de las Alcaldías Indígenas 
[Historical Trajectory of Indigenous Mayoralties], 28 MOMENTO, no. 4, 2013, at 3, 
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 347. Id. at art. 55–56. 
 348. Id.  
 349. Id. at art. 56, 58. 
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public funds.350 Unfortunately, this Law does not resolve the frequent 
conflicts between the official municipal governments and indigenous 
leaders.351 
Under the Municipal Code, seven separate provisions govern public 
access to information and citizen participation. Article 60 generally charges 
Municipal Councils with an obligation to provide information to the 
community and facilitate its participation.352 Access to public information 
under the Code pertains solely to municipal matters.353 The Municipal 
Council decides by a two-thirds vote whether the issue before it merits a 
consultative process.354 Alternatively, a minimum of 10% of registered 
community voters may sign a petition to request a consultation.355 If 20% 
have signed, the Municipal Council must implement it.356 
Article 65 of the Municipal Code expressly codifies indigenous peoples’ 
right to consult. It provides that, when indigenous peoples’ interests and 
rights are affected, the Municipal Council shall undertake a consultative 
process at the request of the community or indigenous leaders.357 The process 
includes adopting the customary laws and traditions of the indigenous 
peoples.358 Therefore, the provision requires a consultative process upon the 
request of indigenous communities and relies on procedures that conform to 
local indigenous customs.  
Article 66 governs consultation procedures and their legal effect.359 This 
provision reiterates that the Municipal Council may fulfill its obligations 
through an official ballot or in accordance with the community’s legal 
norms.360 The results of the consultation are binding if at least 50% of eligible 
voters in the municipality participate and the majority favors a particular 
course of action.361 Thus, the Municipal Code provides indigenous 
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communities with the ability to compel a binding, consultative process 
according to their customs so long as a majority participates. 
The Municipal Code leaves unresolved whether the consultative process 
binds the Guatemalan central government, which has the exclusive power to 
authorize mining licenses. Article 125 of the Guatemalan Constitution places 
the decision of whether to exploit renewable and non-renewable resources 
with the central government.362 Perhaps this explains why the 1997 Mining 
Law does not address a consultative process. At most, the Mining Law’s 
regulations contemplate the participation of affected communities through 
interviews, surveys, workshops, assemblies, or working group meetings.363 
This process, however, does not consider the cultural and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the affected community.364 Even Guatemala’s 
Constitutional Court found that the Mining Law fails to comply with 
international norms.365 
There have been either no consultations by the central government at 
all––at least for early mining projects––or consultations have been less than 
ideal with actors involved in mining conflicts.366 Civil groups opposing metal 
mining have engaged in community-led referendum processes in 
approximately 30 municipalities367 and the results overwhelmingly 
demonstrate opposition to mining.368 These referenda consist of ballots with 
                                                                                                                 
 362. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 125. 
 363. MARN Reglamento de Evalución, Control, y Seugimiento Ambiental, Acuerdo Gubernativo 
Número 431-2007, at art. art. 74(b) (2007). 
 364. See Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 22. 
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supra note 368, at 7 fig.1, 9 fig.3. When one considers all development projects, including hydroelectric 
plants and petroleum, the number of community-led consultative processes between 2005 and 2013 rises 
to 73. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 14. 
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broadly worded questions that ask for a vote on whether a specific project 
should go forward, whether to exploit natural resources, or both questions.369 
These processes are held with or without the municipality’s participation. 
Whether consultation takes place usually depends on the local mayor’s 
position toward mining.370 These processes are diverse and inconsistent in 
terms of the actors who participate in the consultation.371 
Mining companies respond to the conflicts generated by the lack of 
consultation by starting their own dialogues. The companies hold voluntary 
workshops that involve certain community members, military and police 
representatives, and mining employees.372 In an attempt to generate this 
dialogue between the State, the private sector, and communities, mining 
companies support government initiatives that bypass the electoral 
process.373 Members of civil society criticize these methods. First, they 
question the legitimacy of those who represent the community. Second, they 
argue that the purpose is largely to appease opposition with nominally 
beneficial offers that do not address the looming problems that mining causes 
in the communities.374 
The Guatemalan Constitutional Court does not recognize these non-
governmental consultations as binding on MEM when issuing mining 
licenses, even if the consultative process satisfies Municipal Code 
procedures.375 In 2005, in a challenge filed by Montana Exploradora against 
the consultation process executed in Sipacapa in accordance with a municipal 
agreement, the Constitutional Court declared that the procedures followed 
were not contrary to the Guatemalan Constitution.376 However, in 2007, the 
Guatemalan Constitutional Court held that the central government had sole 
                                                                                                                 
 369. PBI MINING BULLETIN, supra note 47, at 7. 
 370. See, e.g., id. 
 371. Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 48. 
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jurisdiction to conduct consultative processes for projects involving 
renewable resources.377 It further declared unconstitutional Article 27 of the 
Municipal Act insofar as it bound the central government to the results of the 
consultative process contrary to Article 125 of the Constitution, which grants 
the central government sole authority over natural resources.378 In 2009, the 
Constitutional Court again recognized the State’s duty to guarantee the 
collective right of indigenous people to consultation but insisted that the 
results of such consultation are non-binding.379 In nearly all of these rulings, 
the Constitutional Court called on the Guatemalan Congress to enact a law 
governing the consultative process.380 This implies that the Court does not 
view the three laws promoting decentralization as relevant to this process.381 
Between 2010 and 2011, Guatemala attempted but failed to adopt a 
regulation governing the consultative process consistent with ILO 169.382 
Not surprisingly, international bodies charged with overseeing the 
consultative process under ILO 169 criticize Guatemala’s implementation. 
In 2010, for example, the ILO and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights requested that Guatemala suspend operations of the Marlin I 
mine due to inadequate consultations.383 In June 2010, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, called on the 
Guatemalan government to adopt a law defining and assuring indigenous 
peoples’ rights to consultation on resource development projects.384 Anaya, 
however, emphasized the importance of Guatemalans moving beyond a 
narrow focus on the binding nature of referendum results, and focusing 
instead on the importance of adopting a more robust process that conforms 
to the procedures and goals of ILO 169.385 Five years later, Guatemala 
continues to operate the Marlin I mine while the consultative process remains 
unchanged. 
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3. Property Rights 
The Guatemalan mining regulatory regime is silent on several important 
issues that pertain to property conflicts. Consequently, there is no regulation 
or accountability over mining practices that affect property rights. 
In contrast to countries like the United States,386 mineral rights in 
Guatemala are severed. This means that private citizens or corporations own 
surface rights while the central government retains all mineral rights under 
Article 121 of the Guatemalan Constitution.387 Guatemalan law poorly 
defines the relationship between the central government’s ownership of 
mineral rights and the rights of indigenous peoples over communal lands. No 
law in Guatemala proscribes mining in indigenous territory or on lands that 
have a special cultural or spiritual significance to indigenous communities.388 
In 2005, Guatemala adopted a cadastral law—a law to map out the country’s 
land and real estate ownership.389 Unfortunately, this law does not consider 
the historical record of land ownership or require consultation with 
indigenous peoples.390 The Mining Law makes generous property 
concessions to mining companies in terms of territory and access,391 and it 
does not require the environmental impact study to consider the potential 
impact on properties around the mine.392 If mining activities make it 
impossible for local communities to remain in an area, no law contemplates 
who should bear relocation costs or what practices should follow. At a 
minimum, Article 16 of ILO 169 requires that, in the exceptional case when 
indigenous peoples must be relocated, the State must guarantee their safe 
return after addressing the reasons for their displacement.393 
E. Mining Revenues and Public Spending 
Guatemala’s existing legal framework lacks transparency and 
accountability requirements for metal mining revenues. The Guatemalan 
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government has a history of collaborating with the private sector to rob 
Guatemalans of their public funds.394 Indeed, Guatemala consistently scores 
quite low on the Corruption Perception Index, ranking 115 out of 175 
countries in 2014.395 In Guatemala, corruption is hard to fix because it is 
systemic. The major factors contributing to corruption include outdated laws, 
weak institutions, inadequate access to public information, limited public 
participation, conflicts of interest, and impunity.396 Public expenditures in 
Guatemala are particularly vulnerable to corruption because they are 
dispersed through a system of trusteeships that involve poorly-regulated 
committees comprised of public and private actors who lack transparency 
and accountability.397 This means that the national and municipal 
governments do not keep or make public records of total mine-related 
royalties and taxes received, or how these revenues are spent.398 
Addressing fiscal transparency in Guatemala is key to the country’s 
democratic development. Fiscal transparency laws are weak and may require 
constitutional amendment. Access to information is a constitutional 
guarantee399 and Guatemala passed the Law on Access to Public Information 
(LAPI) in 2008.400 But the Guatemalan Constitution and LAPI401 make it 
illegal to publicly disclose the amount of taxes paid by any private individual 
or corporate entity.402 As a result, all disclosures from the mining industry of 
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taxes paid are discretionary and self-reported.403 In practice, the information 
provided by the metal mining industry is too incomplete or piecemeal to be 
helpful; transparency from the metal extractive industry in Guatemala is, in 
fact, among the weakest in Latin America.404 Regulatory agencies exacerbate 
this problem by failing to provide timely, public information about mining 
that is clear , such as mining activities’ fiscal contributions.405 Since 2012, 
the additional mining royalties have further concealed what happens with 
mining money in Guatemala because these are not taxes collected by law.406 
III. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR GUATEMALA’S METAL MINING 
PROBLEM 
This Part of the Article examines potential options for Guatemala to ban 
future mining and manage ongoing mining concessions, including possibly 
shutting down these operations under existing law. Guatemala has been 
engaged in a process of reform for at least a decade without success.407 
However, Guatemala did not start with reforms that banned mining, but 
modified existing laws to continue mining operations. As discussed below, 
this approach is not effective.408 A better alternative for Guatemala is to ban 
metal mining. To support this proposal, this analysis reviews metal mining 
bans in neighboring Central American countries and extracts potential 
lessons for Guatemala. These countries have comparable economies, shared 
histories, and similarities in some of the issues confronting mining; therefore, 
these countries provide a compelling case for a potential metal mining ban in 
Guatemala. 
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A. Inadequacy of Mining Reforms in Guatemala to Date 
Guatemala attempted to amend its mining laws 11 times in the past 
decade alone.409 Moreover, on June 19, 2008, the Constitutional Court 
declared seven articles of the 1997 Mining Law unconstitutional for failing 
to comply with the Constitution’s environmental obligations.410 Specifically, 
the Constitutional Court agreed with the Center for Environmental and Social 
Legal Action (CALAS) that the Mining Law’s provision implying approval 
from administrative inaction for longer than 30 days in response to an EIA 
violated the State’s obligation to protect the environment.411 The 
Constitutional Court also agreed that the Law’s failure to define or limit the 
depth of exploitation permitted for mining also violated the State’s obligation 
to protect the environment.412 Moreover, the Constitutional Court held that 
the law’s permissiveness in allowing the release of contaminated waters from 
mining activities violated the State’s obligation to protect the environment.413 
Finally, the Constitutional Court held that requiring that mining operations 
only mitigate waste and noise to the “extent possible” violated the State’s 
obligation to protect the environment.414 
In response to this holding, Guatemala imposed a moratorium on mining 
until reforms to the Mining Law were adopted.415 Former President Otto 
Pérez Molina and MEM presented the last set of reforms to Congress on 
October 12, 2012.416 To date, Congress has not adopted these reforms.417 The 
proposed reforms recognize that mining makes positive economic 
contributions to Guatemala but also acknowledge several deficiencies in the 
1997 laws that gave rise to conflict.418 One category of reforms focuses on 
strengthening government institutions charged with implementing the 
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Mining Law. For example, one of the identified deficiencies pertains to 
MARN’s institutional weakness in enforcing environmental laws under the 
1997 Mining Law. This law did not specifically grant MARN authority to 
apply the Improvement and Protection of the Environment Law to mining 
activities.419 The proposed reform simply includes a new provision explicitly 
demanding that MARN monitor environmental compliance prior to resource 
extraction, but it fails to specify how early and in what capacity.420 It also 
fails to instruct how to resolve conflicts between the decisions of MEM and 
MARN. 
A second category of reforms focuses on social aspects by proposing 
improved communications between MEM and the Municipal Development 
Councils.421 For example, MEM should hold a meeting in person with the 
Municipal Council to explain––in a culturally appropriate way––the 
environmental and technical aspects of a mining project compared to its 
economic benefits.422 These meetings should not replace the ILO 169 
consultative process.423 These reforms also create a broad principle of 
corporate social responsibility, and requires periodic health assessments for 
the mine.424 A separate provision permits the State to create public mining 
companies and declares, in absolute terms, that the State exclusively holds 
the property rights to any substance found in the subsoil.425 This provision 
does not attempt to clarify how property rights in the subsoil relate to surface 
property rights. For example, it does not address what should happen when 
the surface property belongs to an indigenous community’s ancestral lands 
or is located in a similarly protected area. 
Another important section fills some gaps from the 1997 Mining Law 
by addressing mining’s effect on the environment. For example, it requires 
closing the mine to restore affected areas to the land’s original state or to an 
alternative state––so long as the community can productively use the land.426 
The reforms also contemplate the need for a plan that monitors water use and 
contamination resulting from mining activities.427 Finally, there are 
provisions related to taxes and royalties.428 The reforms would no longer 
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exempt mining companies from taxes; instead, royalties would increase from 
1% to a variable system that depends on the type of mineral being mined.429 
Under this system, royalty payments for precious metals would increase to 
5%.430 The law also contemplates that 55% of the royalties would go to local 
communities and be invested in sustainable projects beyond the life of the 
mine.431 A United States State Department report noted that “[o]n November 
28, 2014, however, the Guatemalan Congress passed the 2015 national 
budget that increases royalties from 1 to 10% on most private mining 
operations,” 90% of which would go to the central government and only 10% 
to the municipalities.432 Investors are challenging the legality of this 
change.433 
If adopted, some of the proposed changes to the Mining Law would be 
an improvement from the status quo. However, they are neither sufficient nor 
likely to be well-executed. The reforms fail to address critical issues, such as 
meaningful decisionmaking, economic participation by local communities, 
and reforms to public spending laws and policies. Second, the proposed 
reforms depend on political will to produce change, such as significantly 
increasing MARN’s resources to enable the agency  to do its job. Third, these 
reforms will be meaningless when applied to Guatemala’s weak democracy. 
To enhance accountability, Guatemala must strengthen its democratic 
institutions and entities charged with enforcing environmental laws, and 
improve public participation in the democratic process. These types of 
changes require long-term, systemic reforms. Guatemala is simply not ready 
for metal mining. 
B. Banning Metal Mining in Guatemala: A Comparative Assessment of 
Domestic Law and International Liability 
1. Banning Future Metal Mining 
In Central America, three countries—Costa Rica, Honduras, and El 
Salvador—imposed restrictions on future mining in their territories.434 The 
                                                                                                                 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 13. 
 432. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015, at 5 (2015), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241790.pdf [hereinafter GUATEMALA INVESTMENT 
STATEMENT]. 
 433. Id. 
 434. EQUIPO REGIONAL DE MONITOREO Y DE ANÁLISIS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN 
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moratoriums on mining in Honduras and El Salvador, however, are ad hoc 
and temporary, similar to the moratorium Guatemala has already attempted. 
Citing water contamination and other environmental concerns,435 El 
Salvador’s former President Antonio Saca imposed a moratorium on mining 
in 2008, which three subsequent administrations followed.436 The ad hoc 
nature of El Salvador’s ban means the nature, scope, and temporal parameters 
of the ban are unknown; however, El Salvador is still attempting to ban 
mining.437 Similarly, in Honduras, the mining sector had been closed to new 
investment since 2005 after the country’s Supreme Court struck down 
portions of its 1999 Mining Law.438 However, Honduras lifted the ban in 
2014 after adopting a new mining law in 2013.439 Unfortunately, the lift of 
the ban, as in Guatemala, renewed and intensified ongoing social conflicts 
around mining.440 In contrast, Costa Rica passed a law that delineates the 
parameters of its permanent mining ban.441 Accordingly, this Article looks to 
Costa Rica as a model. 
a. Nature and Scope: Costa Rica as a Model 
Costa Rica’s democratic stability during Central America’s civil wars 
made the country an early target of mining investment.442 Canadian and 
United States companies became involved in a number of gold and silver 
                                                                                                                 
2013–2014, at 47–48 (2014), http://www.fespad.org.sv/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Dddhh20141.pdf. In 
contrast, Nicaragua, the largest producer of gold in Central America, and Panama, predicted to become a 
major copper-exporting country, have increased mining in recent years. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL 
INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 34. 
 435. Despite the moratorium, water contamination problems from mining persist. In 2012, tests 
completed by El Salvador’s Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources revealed high 
concentrations of cyanide and iron at a location in the San Sebastian River, which flows by the site of the 
San Sebastian gold mine. The agency also reported that approximately 25% of the community lacked 
access to safe drinking water. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 
35. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. at 100. 
 438. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HONDURAS INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2014, at 3 (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230898.pdf. 
 439. Jennifer Moore, No Small Coup: The Honduras Free Trade Agreement, RABBLE.CA (July 
14, 2014), http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/miningwatch/2014/07/no-small-coup-canada-honduras-free-
trade-agreement. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Código de Minería, Decreta No. 6769, art. 8 (Aug. 23, 1982) (Costa Rica), 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/cos67718.pdf, amended by Ley para declarar a Costa Rica País Libre de 
Minería Metálica a Cielo Abierto, Decreta No. 8904, art. 1, (Nov. 9, 2010) (Costa Rica), 
http://www.imprenal.go.cr/pub/2011/02/10/alca11.pdf. 
 442. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 38. 
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exploration and mining operations.443 Beginning in the 1990s, however, 
Costa Rica became a focal point for the international environmental 
movement, which challenged the viability of mining operations in the 
country.444 This anti-mining resistance ultimately affected gold exploration 
and development in the country.445 National gold production has virtually 
disappeared since 2001, mainly due to low international prices and increased 
mine operating costs from stricter regulations, which made mining 
unprofitable.446 Costa Rica also discouraged mining by enacting a 
moratorium and underfunding the agencies charged with approving mining 
concessions, which made mining investment too risky.447 Ultimately, the 
Costa Rican government permanently banned certain types of mining. 
Today, mining investment in Costa Rica is practically zero.448 
Citing environmental concerns, Costa Rica became the first country in 
Latin America to ban open-pit mining in November 2010.449 The effort to 
implement a mining ban in the country started in 2002, with President Abel 
Pacheco signing a ban on new open-pit mining.450 However, in 2008, the 
President and his Environment and Energy Minister were under criminal 
investigation for issuing a permit to a local subsidiary of a Canadian mining 
company, Infinito Gold, to develop “a $66 million open-pit gold mine in the 
fragile ecosystem of the Cerro Crucitas.”451 The government granted a permit 
to Infinito to clear approximately 500 acres of old-growth rainforest.452 
Moreover, two endangered species, the almendro amarillo (yellow almond) 
tree and the Great Green Macaw, reside in this area.453 Former President 
Oscar Arias and his Environment and Energy Minister, Roberto Dobles could 
be held liable for “knowingly approving the clear-cutting of the almendro 
trees (Dipteryxpanamensis), and . . . destroying the habitat of the green 
                                                                                                                 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. at 52. 
 447. Id. at 53. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Law Makers Ban Open Pit Mining, LATIN AMERICA PRESS (Nov. 24, 2010), 
http://www.lapress.org/articles.asp?item=1&art=6269. 
 450. Costa Rica Bans Open Pit Mining, EARTHJUSTICE (June 7, 2002), 
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2002/costa-rica-bans-open-pit-mining. 
 451. Zach Dyer, Costa Rica: From ‘Green’ to Gold?, NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN 
AMERICA (Dec. 26, 2008), https://nacla.org/news/costa-rica-green-gold. 
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macaw (Araambigua).”454 Infinito is also under investigation for illegally 
cutting trees and encroaching on protected areas.455 
The proposed gold mine threatened to tarnish Costa Rica’s image as a 
haven for ecotourism.456 The mine also poses serious threats to public health 
and the environment.457 Moreover, mining has been insignificant in the 
national economy of Costa Rica, contributing only 0.10.2% of the country’s 
GDP annually from 2008 to 2012.458 For these reasons, Costa Rica decided 
that “tourism’s long-term economic gains would be more sustainable than 
the timber and precious metals industries in the country.”459 Costa Rica’s 
national park system is among the most extensive in Latin America.460 It 
includes nearly 4% of the country’s total land area and has 12 parks, 6 nature 
reserves, 4 recreation areas, and several habitat and wildlife areas.461 In 
addition, 23% of Costa Rica’s total land area is protected from all forms of 
mining.462 Finally, Costa Rica is widely recognized as the safest country in 
the region for travelers, which has helped increase its popularity as a vacation 
destination.463 
Shortly after taking office in May 2010, President Laura Chinchilla 
issued a decree banning new open-pit mining contracts in the country, but 
indicated that she would allow the courts to determine whether the Crucitas 
mine would be allowed to proceed.464 Costa Rica banned cyanide leaching 
mining because it was perceivedthough not proventhat inadequate 
regulation of cyanide leaching facilities was causing significant 
environmental degradation.465 The mining industry and interested companies 
have challenged the validity of the mining ban on various constitutional 
grounds.466 
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 456. Id. 
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 458. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 34. 
 459. Costa Rica Gold Mining History and Current Ban, RAREGOLDNUGGETS.COM (July 30, 
2015), http://raregoldnuggets.com/blog/?p=1566. 
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 462. Id. 
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 464. Law Makers Ban Open Pit Mining, supra note 450. 
 465. Jan G. Laitos, Cyanide, Mining, and the Environment, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 869, 911 
(2013). 
 466. Casey Dawson, Why Honduras Should Not Jump on the Ban Wagon: A Study of Open Pit 
Mining Bans and Their Pitfalls, 37 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 67, 85 (2014). For a helpful discussion 
of the history of the approval and implementation of Costa Rica’s open-pit gold mining ban, see generally 
Eugenia Wo Ching, The First Latin American Country Free of Open–Pit Gold Mining, in THE EARTH 
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Although seemingly ambitious, Costa Rica’s mining ban is consistent 
with bans in other domestic and international environmental law contexts. 
Ample precedent exists for prioritizing environmental conservation goals 
over economic gains in contexts ranging from regulation of the atmosphere 
to management of the oceans. Bans on economically lucrative, but 
environmentally destructive practices first appeared in the marine law 
context. One of the earliest examples is the moratorium on commercial 
whaling under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
(ICRW).467 Commercial whaling was highly lucrative because of high market 
demand for whale products, which pushed many whale species to the brink 
of extinction. The moratorium was initially intended to be temporary, but has 
remained in effect for decades with very limited exceptions.468 Other bans on 
lucrative yet destructive marine practices include national and subnational 
bans on shark finning469 and bans on the use of driftnets on the high seas.470 
A successful ban of an environmentally destructive practice also exists 
in the atmospheric protection context. A well-known example is the ban of 
stratospheric ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) under the 
Montreal Protocol, which began in the late 1980s.471 CFCs are chemicals 
used in the production of air conditioning and refrigeration that were linked 
to depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, which is essential to protect 
biological life from the sun’s harmful UV-B rays.472 In response to this 
challenge, the international community developed and implemented one of 
the most successful environmental treaties, which phased out CFCs and 
replaced them with ozone-friendly alternatives.473 
                                                                                                                 
CHARTER, ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 216, 228 (Laura Westra & Mirian Vilela 
eds., 2014).  
 467. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 
161 U.N.T.S. 72, 74 (organizing a league of nations to regulate the whaling industry). 
 468. The two exceptions under the ICRW are: (1) scientific research and (2) aboriginal 
subsistence. 
 469. See, e.g., Shark Conservation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-348, 124 Stat. 3668 
§ 102(a)(1)(C) (2011) (prohibiting the removal of shark fins); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2021 (West 
2016). 
 470. Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, Nov. 24, 
1989, 1899 U.N.T.S. 1. (also referred to as the “Wellington Convention”). 
 471. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 
11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 323.  
 472. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 567 (3d ed. 
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 473. See Ian Rae, Saving the Ozone Layer: Why the Montreal Protocol Worked, CONVERSATION 
(Sept. 9, 2012), https://theconversation.com/saving-the-ozone-layer-why-the-montreal-protocol-worked-
9249 (explaining the Montreal Protocol and the reasons for its success). 
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Consequently, Costa Rica’s metal mining ban and the proposed 
Guatemalan ban draw support from these marine and atmospheric success 
stories. The proposed Guatemalan ban is even more compelling than these 
examples because of the extensive property and social impacts involved. 
b. Assessing Costs 
Guatemala’s decision to ban mining would result in some costs for the 
country. Mining revenues are significant for Guatemala,474 a country 
experiencing a fiscal deficit due to a weak tax regime and corruption.475 If 
Guatemala’s Mining Law were reformed to increase royalties, these revenues 
could be even greater. Although there are other indirect economic gains from 
mining,476 mining’s environmental and social costs overshadow them.477 
Guatemala cannot simply ignore these costs when assessing mining’s fiscal 
benefits, especially when those most harmed by the activity are not the 
beneficiaries of its revenue. Guatemala will not benefit from mining until it 
adopts a law that accurately accounts for mining’s environmental and social 
costs. Moreover, Guatemala needs to address the distributional unfairness of 
the existing mining regime. Guatemala must first reform the mining industry 
so that its economic benefits flow to those communities most negatively 
affected. Finally, Guatemala has options to make up the fiscal impact from 
lost mining revenues. Such options could include: reengaging comprehensive 
tax reforms that also tackle fiscal mismanagement and transparency;478 
effectively capitalizing on remittances that Guatemalan emigrants send to the 
                                                                                                                 
 474. See supra Part II.E (explaining how the lack of transparency and accountability requirements 
for mining revenues enable corruption in Guatemalan government). 
 475. ESTUDIO ECONÓMICO DE AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, GUATEMALA 2 (2015) [hereinafter 
CEPAL ECONOMIC REPORT], 
http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/38713/Guatemala_es.pdf?sequence=65  (estimating a 
2% fiscal deficit for Guatemala). 
 476. See supra Part I.C (comparing mining costs with social and environmental costs). 
 477. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining mining’s environmental and health impacts).  
 478. Guatemala has always collected few taxes compared to other Latin American countries and 
its investment is extremely low in social programs. In 2012, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
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country;479 and encouraging the development of industries with great 
potential, such as ecotourism. 
Another potential economic impact from a ban is a reduction in foreign 
direct investment (FDI). But concern about this impact is probably 
misplaced. As in other Central American countries,480 low FDI can be 
attributed to other factors including: confusing laws and regulations, an 
ineffective judiciary, bureaucratic impediments, undeveloped human capital, 
political instability, corruption, and widespread crime.481 Indeed, economists 
estimate that Guatemala’s recent corruption scandals are likely to impede the 
steady economic growth of the country, particularly by reducing FDI.482 
Moreover, Costa Rica’s FDI has not suffered as a result of its ban on mining. 
Even after the ban, Costa Rica continues to be a popular destination for 
investment with a record to prove it.483 Further, Guatemala has better FDI 
options than mining. Currently, Guatemala’s FDI is principally focused on 
mining and energy infrastructure, manufacturing, and agriculture.484 Yet 
Guatemala has great potential for economic development through 
ecotourism, for example.485 
                                                                                                                 
 479. In contrast to mining, the contribution to Guatemala’s GDP from remittances is substantial: 
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 481. GUATEMALA INVESTMENT STATEMENT, supra note 433, at 3. 
 482. CEPAL ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 476, at 1. 
 483. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COSTA RICA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015, at 3 (2015), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241737.pdf. 
 484. GUATEMALA INVESTMENT STATEMENT, supra note 433, at 3. 
 485. Ecotourism, if managed properly, can even be an important conservation tool for developing 
nations. Christina M. Argueta, Mending Guatemala’s Tourism Industry Through Private Regulation, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1381, 1407–08 (2014); Tim Wallace & Daniela N. Diamente, Keeping People in the 
Parks: A Case Study from Guatemala, 23 NAPA BULL. 191 (2005). See also LAURA DRISCOLL ET AL., 
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE TRAVEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF ECOTOURISM AS A DEVELOPMENT AND 
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Finally, a mining ban—depending on its scope—may cost Guatemala 
millions in arbitration costs. At a minimum, companies with an exploration 
mining license could attempt to sue Guatemala in the same way they have 
sued the government of El Salvador.486 Canada’s Pacific Rim Mining 
Corporation filed an arbitration complaint against El Salvador through the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and 
sought damages of more than $77 million it claimed to have invested in El 
Salvador since 2002, primarily in its El Dorado gold project.487 Initially the 
ICSID dismissed the case because Pacific Rim attempted to use a United 
States subsidiary to file a Central American Free Trade Agreement claim; 
however, the complaint proceeded under El Salvador’s domestic investment 
law, which allows arbitration of disputes with foreign investors.488 Pacific 
Rim, which only holds an exploration license, alleged nonetheless that El 
Salvador’s refusal to grant environmental permits was unjustified.489 
2. Shutting Down Current Metal Mining 
This Part will focus on shutting down mining concessions that are in 
operation, either in the exploration or exploitation stages. Mining exploration 
                                                                                                                 
CONSERVATION TOOL IN THE OSA PENINSULA, COSTA RICA (2011), 
http://www.responsibletravel.org/resources/documents/reports/tinker_final_report_master.pdf 
(concluding that ecotourism in the Osa represents a different, and better, form of development than the 
existing extractive alternatives). 
 486. Two international arbitration claims have been filed by mining companies against El 
Salvador before the ICSID for the country’s decision to shut down mining operations, but only the one 
filed by Pacific Rim is pending. The ICSID dismissed the other claim filed by Commerce Group Corp. 
and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. in 2011 based on their failure to comply with CAFTA’s waiver 
provisions. Commerce Group Corp. et al. v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, 
Award (Mar. 14, 2011). The claimants sought to annul the 2011 judgment, but the proceedings were 
closed in 2013 due to the claimants’ non-payment of filing fees. Commerce Group Corp. et al. v. The 
Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Order of the Committee Discontinuing the 
Proceedings and Decision on Costs (Aug. 23, 2013). While this judgment represented a victory for the 
Salvadoran government, the decision is solely procedural and not a decision on the merits. 
 487. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 35. See also 
Collins, supra note 387, at 253–62 (reviewing the facts and events of the Pacific Rim El Dorado project 
EIA process).  
 488. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 35. Article 15 of 
El Salvador’s Investment Law, however, limits a foreign investor’s access to international dispute 
resolution and may obligate them to use national courts, but only if the foreigner comes from a country 
without a preexisting trade agreement with El Salvador. EL SALVADOR INVESTMENT STATEMENT 2015, 
supra note 481, at 10. Canada does not currently have a trade agreement with El Salvador. See Canada-
Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador (Formerly Canada – Central American Four) Free Trade 
Agreement Negotiations, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/honduras/ca4.aspx?lang=eng (last visited May 16, 2016). 
 489. EL SALVADOR INVESTMENT STATEMENT 2015, supra note 481, at 9. 
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can take years and usually involves significant investment.490 Exploring 
minerals, for example, requires companies to acquire surface property rights 
and to drill with expensive equipment.491 Once the mine is in full operation, 
the investment is even greater because it requires, among other expenses, 
purchasing expensive equipment, building infrastructure, and hiring 
employees. Mining companies that must shut down existing mining 
operations undoubtedly face significant investment losses. Companies may 
claim lost revenue from unmined minerals. Therefore, this Part explores 
whether these companies may seek an expropriation claim in an international 
arbitration. If so, the next issue is how to determine just compensation under 
these circumstances.  
International arbitration claims against developing nations threaten the 
adoption of more sustainable mining policies. According to a recent report 
by the Institute for Policy Studies, of the 169 cases pending at the ICSID, 60 
involved mining or hydrocarbons extraction and half of these disputes arose 
in Latin America.492 This Part proposes how Guatemala could carefully 
proceed to ban current mining operations while minimizing investor liability. 
To draw lessons for Guatemala, this Part examines both Guatemala’s 
investor rights regime and the expropriation claims pending before 
international tribunals against El Salvador and Costa Rica. Finally, this Part 
recommends how Guatemala’s existing environmental regime could ban 
current mining projects while reducing the specter of mining company 
compensation.  
a. Guatemala’s Investor Rights Regime 
Guatemala’s regime protecting FDI assets and interests, as well as the 
resolution of disputes involving FDI claims, is quite favorable toward foreign 
investors. In 1998, Guatemala adopted the Foreign Investment Law, which 
eliminated trade-related investment restrictions to ensure that it was 
compliant with the World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations under the 
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).493 Guatemala 
is also a party to 11 free trade agreements (FTAs), including the CAFTA-
                                                                                                                 
 490. For example, Pacific Rim in El Salvador alleges that its investment had been $77 million 
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DR, which covers the Central American region, the Dominican Republic, and 
the United States.494 Guatemala also has 15 bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) in force.495 The country does not, however, have either an FTA or a 
BIT with Canada.496 Collectively, these instruments have created a number 
of important substantive and procedural foreign investor rights. Foreign 
investor rights include the right to establish, acquire, and operate an 
investment in Guatemala on par with local investors, and the right to receive 
fair market value for property in the case of expropriation.497 
Under Guatemala’s Foreign Investment Law and a number of 
international agreements, foreign investors have the right to resolve disputes 
against the country in an international arbitration process.498 For example, 
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 10 contemplates resolution of investor suits against a 
state through the World Bank’s ICSID or the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).499 Guatemala’s Arbitration Law of 
1995 uses UNCITRAL’s Model Law as the basis for its rules on international 
arbitration.500 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards—to which Guatemala is a signatory—enforces 
foreign arbitral awards.501 In addition, Guatemala is a party to the Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the Panama 
Convention).502 
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Guatemala’s liberalizing trend in trade and investment law, however, 
still recognizes the State’s important role in protecting human, animal, and 
plant health. Some of Guatemala’s international trade or investment 
agreements contain, for example, environmental provisions that require 
Guatemala to ensure that investors do not undermine preexisting 
environmental obligations through development.503 CAFTA-DR is the most 
important example of this type of regime. For example, its preamble instructs 
parties to “implement th[e] Agreement in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation, promote sustainable 
development and strengthen their cooperation on environmental matters.”504 
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 17 also promotes environmental protections as part 
of trade and investment.505 Article 17.2.2 recognizes that “it is inappropriate 
to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the protections 
afforded in environmental laws.”506 In addition, Article 17.3.1 creates an 
obligation on each Party to “ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial, or 
administrative proceedings, in accordance with its law, are available to 
sanction or remedy violation of its environmental laws.”507 Article 17.13.1 
defines environmental law as “any statute or regulation . . . or provision . . . 
the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the 
prevention of a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health.”508 It does 
not, however, include “any statute, regulation, or provision thereof, the 
primary purpose of which is managing the commercial harvest or 
exploitation . . . of natural resources.”509 Thus, foreign investors must accept 
the regulatory regime in which they invest and include this factor into their 
economic assessment of the investment project.510 
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b. Closure of the Mines and Claims of Expropriation: El Salvador and 
Costa Rica as Precursors 
Guatemala has a poor record with international arbitration claims with 
losses in the millions of dollars.511 Guatemala should be concerned about 
liability from investor lawsuits were it to decide to shut down current mining 
projects. Guatemala, however, would not be alone. Two other Central 
American countries—El Salvador and Costa Rica—have opted to shut down 
ongoing mining operations in their respective countries.512 
El Salvador’s moratorium on mining affected Pacific Rim’s exploration 
license; the company’s shares dropped 30% following the moratorium.513 In 
2013, Pacific Rim sold its shares to OceanaGold, an Australian mining 
company.514 By then, Pacific Rim had already filed an arbitration complaint 
with ICSID, alleging damages of over $300 million.515 Pacific Rim contends, 
in a pending complaint, that it relied on El Salvador’s assurances that a 
mining license could be obtained for the property.516 In 2004, Pacific Rim 
submitted the initial environmental permit application to El Salvador’s 
environmental protection agency.517 But the application became embroiled in 
significant social unrest arising from opposition to the mine based on 
environmental concerns.518 
Despite strong and growing opposition to the mine, and an 
environmental impact report that questioned Pacific Rim’s own EIA,519 El 
Salvador’s environmental protection agency granted preliminary approval 
for a mining permit for Pacific Rim to operate the El Dorado mine in the 
neighboring Cabanas province in 2006.520 This approval depended on a final 
EIA report that responded to concerns raised by the agency and community 
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groups.521 According to Salvadoran law, the agency had 2–4 months to either 
deny or accept Pacific Rim’s mining license application; however, this never 
happened.522 Instead, ongoing protests and unrest led then-President Saca to 
order the agency not to issue any new mining permits in 2006, a moratorium 
that continues today.523 Ultimately, Pacific Rim suspended all of its mining 
operations in 2008, and blamed its financial demise on the 2009 presidential 
elections, during which candidates targeted the mining project to gain 
votes.524 
For its part, in a domestic judicial proceeding, Costa Rica shut down San 
Carlos’s Crucitas mine.525 In 2010, Infinito Gold lost its mining concession 
when a Costa Rican judge found irregularities and environmental harms 
resulting from the operation of the mine, including illegal deforestation.526 
Then, in 2011, the Supreme Court of Costa Rica permanently annulled the 
concession and  applied Costa Rica’s new ban on surface or open-pit mining 
to this mining project.527 As a result, Infinito Gold alleged that it lost  $93.9 
million directly and another $1 billion in potential future profit in a complaint 
filed with ICSID.528 
There are important lessons for Guatemala from the experiences of these 
two countries. In El Salvador, the normal legal process for considering 
whether to grant an exploration license was not followed. Rather, these 
processes were interrupted by social unrest such that the country’s 
environmental protection agency never issued a final decision on whether to 
grant the mining concession. These disruptions to the process should not, 
however, minimize the significant environmental problems that the mine 
posed for El Salvador. The mine would draw water from El Salvador’s 
Lempa River.529 The Lempa is El Salvador’s largest river and one of the few 
remaining uncontaminated sources of water in the country on which more 
than three million Salvadorans rely each day for drinking, farming, fishing, 
supporting livestock, and hydroelectric power.530 The El Dorado mine is a 
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significant threat to rural economies and local drinking water supplies 
because it is likely to deplete and contaminate water through a water-
intensive cyanide ore process.531 
The ICSID may dismiss the Pacific Rim claim if it does not recognize 
OceanaGold’s status as an American company.532 However, if the case 
proceeds, the procedural irregularities expose El Salvador to potential 
liability. Given the highly technical nature of EIAs in mining projects, the 
arbitration tribunal will not conduct its own EIA but will either defer to the 
technical environmental findings of the Salvadoran government or actually 
examine the validity of those findings.533 Yet, El Salvador likely lacks 
official domestic documentation of the negative environmental impacts from 
the Pacific Rim to the Lempa River. Its environmental protection agency 
never even made a final determination regarding the mining license’s EIA. 
This allows Pacific Rim to frame its complaint not against El Salvador’s 
environmental regulations of mining projects per se but rather against El 
Salvador’s inconsistent and unexpected implementation of its own 
environmental regime.534 Unfortunately, during the arbitration process, El 
Salvador’s weak environmental regime is likely to be on trial rather than the 
merits of the country’s environmental objections to the mine.535 
Because Costa Rica’s case is distinguishable from El Salvador’s, Costa 
Rica may be in a better legal situation. In Costa Rica, documented 
environmental violations substantiated the domestic judicial shutdown of the 
Crucitas mine.536 As explained in Part III.B.2.c below, a nation that follows 
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due process to implement its domestic environmental regime in a non-
discriminatory fashion should not face liability for its decision. The 
retroactive surface mining ban could result in liability for Costa Rica. The 
mining company could assert unfairness arising from a change in the 
country’s legal regime that invalidated their reliance on the existing law at 
the time of the investment. Yet Costa Rica is not necessarily bound to a fixed 
environmental regime if it can establish changed circumstances and new 
information that merit a different approach.537 In such cases, the arbitration 
tribunal is likely to consider the investor’s reasonable expectations, including 
whether the reforms in the law constituted a reasonable foreseeable risk.538 
c. Defending Against International Arbitration Liability 
Across the globe, governments are asserting domestic environmental 
regimes to stall or stop development projects involving foreign investors.539 
In turn, this trend has fueled a new generation of complaints in arbitration 
tribunals like the complaints against Costa Rica and El Salvador.540 This Part 
examines how Guatemala can best defend itself against a claim of 
expropriation were the country to shut down a current mining project.541 
Guatemala would likely defend itself against an expropriation claim 
based on shutting down a currently-operating mine by claiming that either 
the company’s exploitation license was never valid because the company 
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failed to secure an EIA, or by claiming that it revoked the exploitation license 
because the company violated Article 51 of the Mining Law.542 Ideally, the 
EIA guarantees that the project will not contaminate the environment and 
will ensure ecological equilibrium.543 Article 51 of the Mining Law governs 
the causes for suspension of mining operations, which include “when risks 
or imminent danger to the life of persons or property” exist.544 The primary 
purpose of both the EIA requirement and Article 51 is to protect the 
environment or prevent danger to human, animal, or plant life or health—a 
purpose that falls squarely within the environmental requirements of 
investment treaties, including the CAFTA-DR.545 Thus, if Guatemala follows 
both the substantive and procedural requirements of the EIA requirement and 
of Article 51 respectively, Guatemala should have a strong defense against 
investors’ expropriation claims. In fact, some scholars have even suggested 
that an investment made in violation of a host state’s environmental 
regulation falls outside the protection of CAFTA-DR, depending on the 
nature and gravity of the violation.546 This argument, however, remains 
largely untested. 
Guatemala’s more likely defense, therefore, is that the ban is legitimate 
and proportionate to the need asserted—that is to say, necessary to achieve a 
public purpose.547 Guatemala will also want to assert that the measure does 
not merit compensation because it constitutes a legitimate exercise of 
preexisting regulatory norms that bind investors.548 Important precedents in 
comparative domestic legal systems limit expropriation claims by a state’s 
application of preexisting regulatory requirements, so long as the state 
notified companies and followed due process.549 Until recently, this 
regulatory-takings exemption to expropriation had not been part of the 
international investment regime.550 International investment law does not 
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prohibit all expropriations per se; rather, it draws no distinction between 
compensable takings (i.e., those that lack a legitimate public purpose) and 
non-compensable regulatory measures (i.e., those that serve a legitimate 
public purpose).551 
Fortunately, this legal landscape is changing as investment and trade 
agreements incorporate provisions that explicitly recognize the need to 
balance the individual rights of investors with the regulatory needs of 
societies to protect health and the environment.552 Indeed, some of these trade 
agreements, like CAFTA-DR, have limited expropriation claims arising from 
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions that protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as safeguarding the environment.553 In negotiating CAFTA-
DR, the participating countries proactively addressed dangers posed by an 
overly broad definition of expropriation by including an Annex imposing 
certain limitations on arbitral tribunals’ discretion in construing 
expropriation provisions too broadly.554 Specifically, the Annex establishes 
a presumption that “nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
[intended] to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as . . . the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”555 Only in “rare 
circumstances” is this presumption rebuttable.556 
For Guatemala to assert this type of regulatory exemption (i.e., a non-
compensable taking), it needs to be able to officially document the 
environmental and social harms that justify the measure.557 This will require 
sound scientific evidence.558 Admittedly, under the existing status quo, this 
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would be difficult to provide. Like El Salvador, Guatemala is also vulnerable 
to having its weak institutional practices—approving mining projects and 
EIAs despite significant evidence of environmental and social harms—
weaken the legitimacy of any decision to close a mine. This, however, does 
not preclude Guatemala from starting to take its job of environmental 
regulation seriously. Existing laws may be weak but they do impose 
standards that, if seriously implemented, could yield substantial good faith 
and a legitimate record with which to substantiate any closure decision’s 
legal justification. This would take time and resources, but it is not 
impossible. The 2015 EIA regulations are better already and could be the 
basis for significantly improving the work of MARN when considering new 
applications for exploitation licenses. 
For already-approved mines, Guatemala may still apply Article 51 of the 
Mining Law to account for new information on adverse impacts to 
Guatemala’s environment. Some information may not have been known prior 
to the mine’s exploitation, and thus would not have been reflected in the 
company’s EIA.559 Guatemala may rely on the deficiencies of the mining 
company’s EIA or it may rely on changed environmental expectations, 
resulting from new information, in order to call for a revised regulatory 
response.560 However, to do this well, Guatemala must follow the domestic 
procedures established by law and not act in abrupt, unexpected ways.561 
Guatemalan civil society must persist in filing domestic proceedings to 
pursue an Article 51 remedy.562 Further, Guatemala must cease conducting 
delayed and sham proceedings to stall or deny these claims. This is especially 
important because Guatemala would have to assert that it acted in accordance 
with due process.563 Article 51 calls for administrative proceedings that are 
subject to judicial review.564 This process requires due diligence to shut down 
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existing mining projects that represent an imminent threat to life, property, 
and the environment. 
To determine if a regulation constitutes a disguised protectionist 
measure that discriminates against foreign investment, a tribunal is likely to 
examine the motive behind Guatemala’s mine closure. Guatemala could not, 
for example, simply take over the mine or sell it to another company without 
addressing the environmental concerns that led to the mine’s seizure in the 
first place.565 The regulatory measures would need to be applied evenly to all 
metal mining projects and any exemptions would need to be substantiated 
based on sound scientific evidence. 
Even if Guatemala takes all of these measures, an arbitration tribunal 
may still determine that the environmental regulations constitute an indirect 
expropriation and could mandate compensation to mining companies.566 
Damages, however, should be more limited than what mining companies 
currently claim. For example, mining companies should only recover what 
they have invested to explore the presence of minerals in the country. 
Damages should not be based on speculative expected profits from 
exploitation.567 For exploitation licenses, a mining company’s claim to future 
profits should be reduced by the cost of preexisting environmental 
obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
Shortly after the resignation of former President Otto Pérez Molina on 
September 3, 2015, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala issued two 
important environmentally-friendly decisions involving the El Escobal mine 
in San Rafael, Las Flores. The first decision recognized the fundamental 
human right to water, which requires MARN to closely monitor the effect of 
the El Escobal mine on the availability and quality of water.568 Presumably, 
MARN would close the mine if its operation infringes on the human right to 
consumption of water.569 The second decision affirmed that MEM violated 
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due process rights by denying a hearing to hundreds of individuals who filed 
environmental opposition claims against the mining concession.570 This 
second ruling rolled back the entire administrative process to the date of the 
original opposition filings prior to the mining license concession, and ordered 
MEM to grant a hearing with regard to the opposition’s filings. Presumably, 
this voids the mining concession, at least according to an interpretation held 
by CALAS—which filed the claim—and many other environmental groups. 
But that interpretation is contested in the Guatemalan media.571 
There is uncertainty in either case whether the rulings will lead to a 
closure of the mine, but it is the closest Guatemala has come to shutting down 
a mining project based on environmental concerns. Tahoe Resources, the 
company that owns El Escobal, claims that it is the third largest mine in the 
world with a deposit of silver, lead, zinc, and gold valued in the billions.572 
Tahoe Resources has also invested millions in the two years the mine has 
operated.573 Were the mine to be shut down based on these rulings, 
Guatemala would likely face an international arbitration claim in the millions 
of dollars. If this happened, the institutional environmental weaknesses that 
were the basis for the judicial challenges in Guatemalan courts could 
compromise Guatemala’s defense. 
This does not mean that the environmental concerns lack merit. Ample 
evidence documents the significant environmental, health, and other social 
harms resulting from mining in the country.574 In June 2015, we visited the 
El Escobal mine and heard directly from more than 30 residents of several 
communities around the mine about the depletion and contamination of water 
sources.575 But it is not too late for Guatemalan environmental institutions to 
remedy their weak track record of documenting mining’s environmental 
harms. The Constitutional Court gave MARN not just a mandate, but an 
opportunity to build a record of how the El Escobal mine is affecting water 
in the region. When we visited MARN, our sense was that the agencyat 
least under the interim leadershipwanted a larger role to define the 
environmental impacts from mining, but it lacked the resources and the 
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political space to act. MARN now has the backing of Guatemala’s highest 
court and civil society. And it should act, not only for the sake of the residents 
near the El Escobal mine, but also for the State, to avoid the risk of putting 
MARN’s institutional weakness on trial before an international arbitration 
tribunal. 
